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Incapacitating Criminal Corporations 
W. Robert Thomas* 
If there is any consensus in the fractious debates over corporate 
punishment, it is this: a corporation cannot be imprisoned, incarcerated, 
jailed, or otherwise locked up. Whatever fiction the criminal law 
entertains about corporate personhood, having a physical “body to 
kick”—and, by extension, a body to throw into prison—is not one of them. 
The ambition of this project is not to reject this obvious point but rather 
to challenge the less-obvious claim it has come to represent: 
incapacitation, despite long being a textbook justification for punishing 
individuals, does not bear on the criminal law of corporations. 
This Article argues that incapacitation both can and should serve 
as a justification for punishing criminal corporations. Descriptively, it 
interrogates how rote appeals to the impossibility of corporate 
imprisonment obscure more pressing, challenging questions about 
whether and to what extent the criminal law can vindicate an account 
of incapacitation that extends to corporate persons. Excavating a richer 
conceptual framework for incapacitation from our practices of 
individual punishment demonstrates that sanctions already imposed in 
or just outside the criminal law can be better understood as efforts to 
incapacitate, rather than to deter or rehabilitate, a criminal corporation. 
Indeed, reevaluating the law’s understanding of penal incapacitation 
provides reason to think that there are similar and perhaps stronger 
reasons for incapacitating corporate persons than there are for 
individuals. 
Prescriptively, the Article leverages this comparative framework 
to argue that incapacitation should be recognized as a core justification 
for corporate punishment. Although rehabilitation has gained traction 
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in past decades as a basis for punishing corporations, incapacitation 
stands as a more realistic, more administrable alternative. This is 
because a principle of rehabilitation has led to a practice of imposing on 
corporations intricately designed but dubiously effective internal 
compliance and governance reforms. Incapacitation, by contrast, lends 
itself to clear, discrete prohibitions for which the criminal law is better 
situated to justify, impose, and monitor. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Sometimes, corporations do bad things. Volkswagen taught cars 
how to cheat on emissions tests,1 while Google programmed its Street 
View fleet to “wiretap” private wireless networks.2 Siemens kept desks 
full of cash at offices around the world to bribe local officials.3 
Odebrecht’s kickback scheme has implicated more than a thousand 
politicians throughout Latin America and Europe.4 Months before 
eleven workers died at the Deepwater Horizon spill, British Petroleum 
admitted that it had never fixed safety violations that caused fifteen 
deaths in a prior refinery explosion—even despite three intervening 
fatal accidents.5 Wells Fargo did not require its employees to break 
federal banking law, but it did make it virtually impossible for them to 
keep their jobs unless they did.6 And, of course, the head of an 
international drug cartel recently praised HSBC as “the place to 
launder money.”7  
What should we do when corporations break bad? For more than 
a century, the United States has recognized that commercial 
corporations, just like individuals, can be found guilty of a crime.8 On 
the other hand, and longevity notwithstanding, the federal criminal law 
of corporations has faced a constant barrage of doctrinal, practical, and 
especially theoretical challenges.9 Yet, across decades of disagreement, 
 
 1. Andrea Peterson & Brian Fung, The Tech Behind How Volkswagen Tricked Emissions 
Tests, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/09/ 
22/the-tech-behind-how-volkswagen-tricked-emissions-tests [https://perma.cc/9DR7-5GGP]. 
 2. David Kravets, An Intentional Mistake: The Anatomy of Google’s Wi-Fi Sniffing Debacle, 
WIRED (May 12, 2012, 7:18 PM), https://www.wired.com/2012/05/google-wifi-fcc-investigation 
[https://perma.cc/D6T5-HJBP]. 
 3. Bavarian Baksheesh, ECONOMIST (Dec. 18, 2008), https://www.economist.com/business/ 
2008/12/18/bavarian-baksheesh [https://perma.cc/7SX2-DXMN]. 
 4. Jonathan Watts, Operation Car Wash: Is This the Biggest Corruption Scandal in History?, 
GUARDIAN (June 1, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/01/brazil-operation-car-
wash-is-this-the-biggest-corruption-scandal-in-history [https://perma.cc/8GC7-NJ7X]. 
 5. Pierre Thomas et al., BP’s Dismal Safety Record, ABC NEWS (May 27, 2010), 
https://abcnews.go.com/WN/bps-dismal-safety-record/story?id=10763042 [https://perma.cc/U6W6-
RQ2M]; Erwin Seba, BP Worker Killed at Texas City Refinery, REUTERS (Jan. 15, 2008, 11:59 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-refinery-operations-bp-worker/bp-worker-killed-at-texas-city-
refinery-idUSN1552142820080115 [https://perma.cc/T372-F49H]. 
 6. Elizabeth C. Tippett, How Wells Fargo Encouraged Employees to Commit Fraud, 
CONVERSATION (Oct. 6, 2016, 9:13 PM), http://theconversation.com/how-wells-fargo-encouraged-
employees-to-commit-fraud-66615 [https://perma.cc/9V32-Z6LG]. 
 7. Aruna Viswanatha & Brett Wolf, HSBC to Pay $1.9 Billion U.S. Fine in Money-
Laundering Case, REUTERS (Dec. 10, 2012, 11:45 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hsbc-
probe/hsbc-to-pay-1-9-billion-u-s-fine-in-money-laundering-case-idUSBRE8BA05M20121211 
[https://perma.cc/8WRL-37LL] (emphasis added). 
 8. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).  
 9. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A 
Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2003) 
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one assertion garners near-universal consensus, providing a touchstone 
of sorts for debates over the possibility of, and the purpose behind, 
corporate responsibility: A corporation cannot be imprisoned, 
incarcerated, jailed, or otherwise locked up.  
It seems trivial to take the sentiment for what it is worth—the 
corporation has “no body to kick,” as they say.10 But what is less obvious, 
though perhaps more surprising, is the extent to which this rote 
assertion has come to stand for a much broader claim that the criminal 
law does not—and cannot—incapacitate corporate criminals. 
Discussions of corporate criminal liability focus overwhelmingly on 
three traditional justifications for punishment: condemning prior bad 
acts,11 deterring future bad actors,12 and rehabilitating criminal 
organizations into good corporate citizens.13 Incapacitation, by contrast, 
receives virtually no attention.14 
This Article articulates and defends the idea that incapacitation, 
a long-standing, textbook rationale for punishing individuals, both can 
and should be extended as a rationale for punishing corporations.15 
Recognizing that the very notion of incapacitating a corporation flies in 
the face of received wisdom, my ambition here is not to reinvent our 
notions of penal incapacitation as much as it is to instead deepen our 
 
(discussing the shift in principal objectives of American criminal law over the last century); John 
Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1329 (2009) (arguing that corporate criminal liability cannot be justified within the 
theoretical structure of American criminal law). 
 10. John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into 
the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981). 
 11. E.g., Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 
473 (2006); Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1 
(2012); David M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings: Reconsidering Corporate Criminal Prosecution, 
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235 (2016). For a discussion of retribution as distinct from condemnation, 
see infra Section I.C.1. 
 12. E.g., V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. 
L. REV. 1477, 1486 (1996); William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox 
of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343 (1999); see also Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the 
Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232 (1985). 
 13. E.g., Mihailis E. Diamantis, Clockwork Corporations: A Character Theory of Corporate 
Punishment, 103 IOWA L. REV. 507 (2018); Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the 
Potential for Rehabilitation, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417 (2009). 
 14. For a notable exception, see Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: 
Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1146–47 (1983). The last 
sustained discussion appears to have been a student note discussing the then-newly adopted 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines. Cf. Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The 
Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1728–31 (2007) (discussing 
Christopher A. Wray, Note, Corporate Probation Under the New Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines, 101 YALE L.J. 2017, 2033–34 (1992)). 
 15. Although incapacitation operates as a justification just outside the criminal law, see 
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring), this Article focuses 
attention on the features and considerations that arise in the specific context of criminal 
punishment. 
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understanding of the concept that we already have. To that end, the 
account of corporate incapacitation developed here comports with both 
(1) settled understanding of incapacitation as a justification for 
individual punishment16 and (2) the types of sanctions generally 
imposed on criminal corporations. Excavating such an account reveals 
that there are good reasons to recognize incapacitation as a justification 
for corporate punishment, while also revealing that prevailing 
arguments advocating its exclusion are surprisingly weak. 
This project is equal parts descriptive and normative. 
Descriptively, this Article diagnoses why federal law and scholarship 
have uniformly—and virtually without discussion, other than to 
remark that a corporation has no body to put in jail—disregarded 
incapacitation’s role in the criminal law of corporations. This oversight 
reflects a broader tendency to look past the varieties and complexities 
of incapacitation as a justification for punishment.17 Discussions of 
penal incapacitation uncritically employ one of two definitions—the 
first overly abstract, the second unduly narrow. At one end, historical 
accounts, like Jeremy Bentham’s classic characterization, explain that 
incapacitation aims for “prevention of similar offences [by] the same 
individual” not by influencing her “will to” recidivate but rather by 
“depriving h[er] of the power to do the like.”18 But while conceptually 
useful for distinguishing incapacitation from other preventative 
justifications—namely, deterrence and rehabilitation—distinctions 
between the “will” to act and the “power” to act offer little traction to 
make sense of incapacitation as a recognizable social practice. At the 
other extreme, recent accounts treating incapacitation as coextensive 
with imprisonment fail to disambiguate a general function of 
punishment from a specific type of punishment;19 in doing so, they 
 
 16. Tracking common usage, I leverage the notion of a “justification for punishment” that is 
treated as coextensive with a “goal of punishment.” E.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010) 
(referring to “retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation” interchangeably as 
“penological justifications” and “goals of penal sanctions”). For a discussion of incapacitation as a 
“justification” for punishment, rather than a “purpose” or “function” of punishment, see infra note 
112.  
 17. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT AND 
THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME, at v (1995) (“[Incapacitation] has received scant attention in 
criminology, in criminal law, or in jurisprudence.”). 
 18. 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, Panopticon Versus New South Wales, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM 174 (John Bowring ed., 1843) [hereinafter BENTHAM, Panopticon].  
 19. See, e.g., Jonathan Simon, Total Incapacitation: The Penal Imaginary and the Rise of an 
Extreme Penal Rationale in California in the 1970s, in INCAPACITATION: TRENDS AND NEW 
PERSPECTIVES 15, 18 (Marijke Malsch & Marius Duker eds., 2012) [hereinafter INCAPACITATION: 
TRENDS] (discussing how incapacitation can be accomplished through means other than 
imprisonment). 
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confuse reliable features of imprisonment with characteristics essential 
to incapacitation more broadly. 
Scrutinizing how incapacitation is evoked or instantiated across 
a variety of individual punishments provides the foundation for 
excavating a richer understanding than either conceptual analysis or 
narrow attention to bodily constraint allows. In different ways, both 
accounts conflate several different modes of restraint that the criminal 
law imposes under the guise of incapacitation. Imprisonment 
exemplifies one such mode of restraint: isolation from the broader 
society. But close attention reveals two other modes of restraint. Capital 
punishment, for example, offers an extreme example of restriction 
through disablement; through imprisonment, a person is permanently 
altered in a manner that renders her incapable of committing those 
same crimes in the future. Supervised release, meanwhile, emphasizes 
restriction through prohibition, whereby a person can participate in a 
community while subject to a host of physical, legal, and technological 
mechanisms that externally limit her ability to act freely.  
Viewing incapacitation from this broader perspective highlights 
that functional analogues to individual practices—even a 
straightforward version of corporate imprisonment20—could feature 
into corporate criminal practice. More to the point, close attention to 
actual practices reveals that such analogues already exist—even if not 
characterized as “incapacitation.” For example, forcing corporations to 
divest of a physical plant, refinery, or division disables them from 
committing future wrongs.21 Several companies have been prohibited 
from pursuing certain lines of business or business practices, from 
associating with specific clients or counterparties, and even from 
continuing to participate in whole industries.22 They have been forced 
to install invasive, compliance-centric “policing measures.”23 They have 
been made to accept (and subsidize) outside monitors with sweeping 
oversight and veto powers over day-to-day managerial decisions.24 And 
in extreme circumstances, they have been permanently divested of all 
 
 20. For an argument that some counterpart of individual imprisonment for corporations is 
conceptually possible but simply not worth pursuing for a wealth of practical and normative 
reasons, see infra Section III.A.3. 
 21. E.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH 
CORPORATIONS 117–46 (2014) (discussing BP’s Texas City Refinery). For an excellent (and 
overlooked) discussion of corporate asset divestiture as incapacitative, see Steven Walt & William 
S. Laufer, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Comparative Mix of Sanctions, in WHITE-COLLAR 
CRIME RECONSIDERED 309, 320–23 (Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd eds., 1992). 
 22. Wulf A. Kaal & Timothy A. Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution 
Agreements on Corporate Governance: Evidence from 1993–2013, 70 BUS. LAW. 61, 94 (2014). 
 23. Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of 
Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 693 (1997). 
 24. Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 14, at 1723–24. 
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assets.25 More to the point, each of these sanctions is imposed either 
through or adjacent to criminal punishment: at sentencing, in a 
deferred or nonprosecution agreement, and after sentencing, by virtue 
of a collateral consequence attaching automatically to the fact of 
conviction.26 In other words, sanctions that incapacitate corporations in 
a manner comparable to how that justification operates in the rest of 
the criminal law already exist either in or just outside the criminal 
justice system.  
Normatively, the criminal law should embrace incapacitation as 
both an applicable theory and worthwhile goal of corporate punishment. 
For starters, society should explicitly recognize corporate incapacitation 
simply because the criminal law already implicitly relies on it. As the 
examples above imply, corporations are being restrained to various 
degrees by sanctions that appear incapacitating in character and 
operation, even if these sanctions are not described or justified as such. 
Indeed, at least some sanctions already employed are better understood 
as efforts to incapacitate rather than to deter or rehabilitate a criminal 
corporation. The doctrinal upshot of this modest defense, then, is that 
merely recognizing corporate incapacitation by itself would not 
dramatically upend core understandings of incapacitation or the 
foundation for approaching corporate punishment. Indeed, uncritical 
assertions that corporate imprisonment is impossible may even get the 
comparison between individual and corporate persons backwards.27 
Ordinarily, incapacitation stands in tension with liberal commitments 
to individual responsibility that are essential to theories of criminal 
punishment.28 Whereas these concerns constrain the propriety of 
incapacitation when levied against individuals in their capacity as 
autonomous moral agents, the same claims fail to attach to corporations 
insofar as a legal entity lacks the requisite normative status.29 A 
surprising implication of this functional approach to incapacitation, 
 
 25. United States v. Najjar, 300 F.3d 466, 485–86 (4th Cir. 2002); see also U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (stating that a court may set a fine 
sufficiently high to divest an organization of all net assets if it finds that the organization operated 
primarily for criminal purposes). 
 26. See GARRETT, supra note 21 (detailing the litigation and sentencing of BP after a series 
of safety violations and accidents at its Texas City Refinery); see also Cindy R. Alexander & Mark 
A. Cohen, The Evolution of Corporate Criminal Settlements: An Empirical Perspective on Non-
Prosecution, Deferred Prosecution, and Plea Agreements, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 537 (2015). 
 27. For a full treatment of this intellectual history, see W. Robert Thomas, How and Why 
Corporations Became (and Remain) Persons Under the Criminal Law, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 479 
(2018). 
 28. See Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as 
Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1438 (2001) (detailing the ethical “conflicts between 
pursuing justice and incapacitating dangerous persons”). 
 29. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 23–25 (1999). 
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then, is that there may be stronger reasons to incapacitate corporations 
than individuals. 
Practically, pursuing an incapacitative agenda—that is, taking 
incapacitation seriously not just as a possibility but as a central 
justification for punishment—would change our current criminal 
justice practices for the better. This is because incapacitation provides 
a better basis for corporate punishment than does rehabilitation. The 
criminal law’s recent embrace of corporate rehabilitation has 
encouraged courts and prosecutors to impose complicated reforms to a 
corporation’s internal governance and compliance structures as 
sanctions.30 However, the design, implementation, and oversight of 
these reorganizations is a difficult task; more to the point, courts and 
prosecutors lack both the expertise and the institutional incentives to 
resolve structural defects impacting recidivist and pervasively criminal 
corporations.31 As a result, there is little indication that criminal-
compliance reforms actually rehabilitate and ample room for 
skepticism. Incapacitation, by contrast, lends itself to clear, bright-line 
prohibitions that are easier for the criminal justice system to justify, 
impose, and monitor. To be sure, incapacitation carries its own risks; 
we need to be careful not to implement restraints so severe as to create 
a de facto “corporate death penalty.”32 Nevertheless, and as the 
framework for analyzing incapacitation developed here demonstrates, 
incapacitation admits of a far wider range of outcomes than termination 
on one hand and no consequence on the other. 
 This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes current federal 
practices of corporate criminal law, focusing on when and how the 
criminal law punishes corporations. It then addresses the justifications 
for corporate punishment currently on offer and contrasts these to the 
absence of incapacitation. Part II diagnoses the shortcomings of 
discussions of incapacitation as a justification for punishment, 
advances a more comprehensive account of the root concept grounded 
on appeal to cases of individual punishment, and defends in principle 
the role that individual practices can play in informing practices of 
 
 30. See U.S. DEP’T JUST., UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL §§ 9-28.1500 (2016) 
[hereinafter U.S. ATT’YS’ MANUAL] (providing guidance for prosecutors on factors to take into 
consideration when charging corporations and negotiating plea agreements); see also Miriam 
Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949 (2009) (describing modern 
compliance’s roots in criminal enforcement); Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of 
Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2133 (2016) (viewing compliance as a means of 
rehabilitating corporations following prosecution). 
 31. See generally PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow 
eds., 2011) (collecting essays). 
 32. Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61 STAN. L. REV. 271, 
277–79 (2008). 
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corporate punishment. Part III extends this account of incapacitation 
to the corporate context, showing that the criminal law can and should 
take incapacitation seriously as a justification for punishing 
corporations. As part of this extension, Part III shows that 
incapacitation may already be implicit in, and thus overlooked in 
discussing, certain practices within corporate criminal law. Part IV 
defends the view that society would be better served by pursuing 
corporate incapacitation rather than corporate rehabilitation, 
sketching initial doctrinal reforms for such an incapacitative agenda. 
Rather than focus on designing new internal compliance and 
governance structures, the proposal is to move toward sanctions that 
would disable or prophylactically prevent future misconduct: forced 
divestiture of physical assets; required exit from business areas, 
practices, and client-counterparty relationships; and mandatory 
preapproval of major asset transactions, to name a few. The ambition 
here is to demystify corporate incapacitation while laying the 
groundwork for a larger empirical investigation into which 
incapacitative sanctions are best suited for which types of offenses and 
offenders—in other words, this Article proposes taking incapacitation 
seriously as a valuable additional justification for punishing criminal 
corporations. 
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF CORPORATE PUNISHMENT 
Corporate criminal liability is a curious—and for many, an 
unfamiliar—subfield of criminal law. With that in mind, this Part 
briefly rehearses the relevant status quo surrounding both the doctrine 
and practice of corporate criminal law and punishment. This exposition 
makes no appeal to incapacitation except to note its absence from 
discussions of corporate punishment and purported absence from 
practice. 
A. The Criminal Law of Corporations 
Contrary to popular belief, criminal law has long been used to 
prosecute and convict corporations.33 That said, the practice of holding 
commercial corporations criminally responsible for general intent 
crimes as well as specific intent crimes—crimes for which there exists 
a proscribed action (actus reus) pursued concurrently with a prescribed 
 
 33. E.g., Commonwealth v. Hancock Free Bridge Corp., 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 58 (1854); People 
v. Corp. of Albany, 11 Wend. 539, 542–43 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834). 
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attitude (mens rea)34—took hold around the turn of the twentieth 
century. Congress began passing statutes that expressly criminalized 
corporate misconduct,35 which the Supreme Court affirmed in its 
seminal 1909 decision in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad 
Company v. United States.36 The resulting approach, embraced both 
then and now, treats criminal law as a unified legal domain concerned 
with misconduct by persons, be they corporate or individual. Of course, 
this presumptive similarity can break down.37 Much of this Article (and 
scholarship on corporate crime generally) is animated by consideration 
of when such a breakdown occurs—that is, which differences between 
corporations and individuals make a legal difference and why.38 With 
that in mind, it is worth noting that the criminal law presupposes 
persons are its object of regulation; no categorical separation exists 
between the criminal law of individuals and of commercial 
organizations.  
Prosecuting corporate crime is hard: cases are factually complex, 
defenders are well funded and well represented, and investigations are 
time and resource intensive.39 Accordingly, the modern criminal law of 
corporations occurs predominantly at the federal level.40 Even there, 
organizational prosecutions make up only a fraction of the federal 
government’s docket, totaling approximately 3,200 corporate criminal 
settlements since 2000.41 While enforcement priorities change over time 
and across administrations, the brunt of cases reliably arise under a 
 
 34. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.2 (3d ed. 2018). 
 35. E.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209–10 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012)); Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847 (1903) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. 
§§ 41–43 (1964)) (repealed 1978).  
 36. 212 U.S. 481 (1909). 
 37. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (denying corporations Fifth Amendment 
protection against self-incrimination and partially extending Fourth Amendment protections); see 
also Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 105 (1988) (reaffirming the principle articulated in 
Hale v. Henkel). 
 38. See infra Section III.C. 
 39. Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 880–81 (2007). 
 40. See Baer, supra note 30, at 958 (“The agency that effectively regulates ‘general’ corporate 
compliance, at least where criminal violations are concerned, is the DOJ.”); see also Griffith, supra 
note 30, at 2078, 2113 (“Moreover, government interventions in compliance come not through the 
traditional levers of state corporate or federal securities law, but rather through prosecutions and 
regulatory enforcement actions.”). 
 41. This approximation is based on data received from the Corporate Prosecution Registry, a 
joint project between Duke University School of Law and the Legal Data Lab at the University of 
Virginia Arthur J. Morris Law Library. See Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, CORPORATE 
PROSECUTION REGISTRY, http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/ 
index.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2018) [https://perma.cc/4YF9-KF8X] [hereinafter PROSECUTION 
REGISTRY]. 
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handful of categories: fraud (24%), environment (24%), bribery and 
money laundering (9%), food and drugs (8%), and antitrust (8%).42 
Like the rest of the criminal law, organizational convictions 
result overwhelmingly from guilty pleas.43 But nonprosecution 
agreements (“NPAs”) and deferred prosecution agreements (“DPAs”) 
provide an alternative form of corporate criminal settlement. The basic 
mechanism of a prosecution agreement loosely resembles pretrial 
diversion: the government agrees not to prosecute a corporation 
(resulting in an NPA) or to indefinitely delay moving forward with an 
indictment (resulting in a DPA). In exchange, the offending corporation 
agrees to a host of conditions that, in practice, are mostly 
indistinguishable from the terms that would otherwise appear in a plea 
agreement.44 Mostly, then, prosecution agreements allow a corporation 
to settle a criminal investigation while avoiding the fact of conviction 
and, particularly, the collateral consequences that would attach as a 
result.45 The use of prosecution agreements by certain divisions of the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”)46 has received widespread attention 
since their rise from obscurity in 200447—though, and coverage 
notwithstanding, there continues to be “far more corporate convictions, 
chiefly in the form of guilty pleas, than deferred and non-prosecution 
agreements.”48 Accordingly, and consistent with the literature, this 
Article includes prosecution agreements alongside discussions of 
 
 42.  See id. A summary of my findings from this database can be found at 
https://perma.cc/54CG-WS9V. 
 43. Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, S-133 tbl.53 
(2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-
sourcebooks/2017/2017SB_Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9AL-TLBQ] [hereinafter Sentencing 
Sourcebook] (92% of dispositions). The interactive sourcebook and archives are available at 
https://www.ussc.gov/research/sourcebook-2017.  
 44. Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Criminal Affirmance: Going Beyond the Deterrence Paradigm to 
Examine the Social Meaning of Declining Prosecution of Elite Crime, 45 CONN. L. REV. 865, 894 
(2013). 
 45. See Jennifer Arlen, Prosecuting Beyond the Rule of Law: Corporate Mandates Imposed 
Through Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 191, 198–99 (2016) (discussing 
the Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) use of DPAs and NPAs in lieu of pursuing criminal 
convictions). 
 46. David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the 
Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1316, 1318 (2013) (“[T]he Criminal 
Division’s widespread use of . . . prosecution agreements sets it apart from the Environment and 
Natural Resources Division and the Antitrust Division.”). 
 47. While corporate prosecution agreements first arose in the early 1990s, Leonard Orland, 
The Transformation of Corporate Criminal Law, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 45, 57 (2006), 
usage escalated dramatically in 2004. Garrett, supra note 39, at 888–89.  
 48. Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1801 (2011). 
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corporate liability and punishment, distinguishing salient features 
when appropriate.49 
Finally, it is worth delineating how corporations are made to fit 
the requirements of criminal law—specifically, how the criminal law 
attributes mens rea to a corporate person. Federal courts continue to 
employ the tort-style doctrine of respondeat superior articulated over a 
century ago in New York Central for determining what actions and 
attitudes may be attributed to a corporation.50 Under this doctrine, “[a] 
corporate person may be liable for a single criminal act by a single agent 
acting in the scope of employment and with the intent to benefit the 
corporation.”51 As a result, the federal doctrine embraces a sweeping 
approach to corporate criminal liability that is at once over- and 
underinclusive of genuine instances of institutional fault—that is, 
misconduct indicating “not just that somebody pursued faulty 
preferences, but that the group arranged itself badly.”52  
On the other hand, settled practice diverges stridently from 
formal doctrine; efforts by various actors within the federal system 
have, over the past twenty years, sought to narrow, albeit in a second-
best manner, the scope of corporate criminal liability for genuine cases 
of corporate wrongdoing.53 First, the DOJ, beginning in 1998, 
unilaterally disclaimed its authority to pursue charges to the full extent 
afforded by law,54 instead promulgating, through a series of 
departmental memos and later the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, detailed 
guidance for how prosecutors should decide whether to prosecute a 
corporation.55 Second, the Sentencing Commission began providing a 
range of punishments, the severity of which scale according to factors 
 
 49. For a discussion of prosecutorial incentives surrounding NPAs and DPAs as it bears on 
the question of justifications for punishment, see infra Section III.B.2. 
 50. See United States v. A&P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 206 (1958) (“[I]t is elementary that 
such impersonal entities can be guilty of ‘knowing’ or ‘willful’ violations of regulatory statutes 
through the doctrine of respondent [sic] superior.”); see also N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. 
v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492–95 (1909) (articulating the doctrine of respondeat superior). 
New York Central is not the first Supreme Court case recognizing that corporations fall within the 
criminal law’s ambit; that decision came three years earlier. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) 
(denying Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination to corporations). 
 51. Garrett, supra note 48, at 1789. 
 52. Buell, supra note 11, at 502. For how this regime is underinclusive of paradigmatic cases 
of institutional fault, see Thomas, supra note 27, at 527. 
 53. Buell, supra note 11, at 476; William S. Laufer & Alan Strudler, Corporate Crime and 
Making Amends, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1307, 1310–11 (2007). 
 54. WILLIAM S. LAUFER, CORPORATE BODIES AND GUILTY MINDS 37 (2006).  
 55. U.S. ATT’YS’ MANUAL, supra note 30, §§ 9-28.000–.300. Compare Garrett, supra note 48, 
at 1796 (“[I]n no other area do federal prosecutors provide such detailed guidelines to explain and 
to limit (albeit in a non-binding way) how they exercise their discretion.”), with Miriam H. Baer, 
Organizational Liability and the Tension Between Corporate and Criminal Law, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 
1, 8 (2010) (“The problem, however, is that the government’s response is entirely discretionary.”). 
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that overlap substantially with the DOJ’s prosecutorial guidelines.56 
These two innovations reinforce each other: both consider whether 
criminal misconduct occurred in the absence of or in spite of a 
compliance program meant to detect individual misconduct,57 both 
consider the corporation’s prior offenses as circumstantial evidence of 
institutional fault,58 and both consider the “pervasiveness” of criminal 
activity throughout the corporation.59 Taken together, what is a 
capacious legal doctrine is tempered by well-established, regimented 
but ultimately discretionary pre- and post-conviction efforts to 
constrain overbreadth in a manner more consistent with traditional 
criminal law principles. 
B. Existing Sanctions for Criminal Corporations 
Consider the range of sanctions available that are commonly 
employed against corporations. Included here are punishments 
resulting from a formal conviction, settlement terms in prosecution 
agreements that serve as something of a quasi-punishment, and, 
briefly, the collateral consequences that attach automatically by 
operation of federal law outside the specific domain of criminal law. 
1. Monetary Sanctions 
For most of the time that corporations have been eligible for 
criminal liability—effectively, prior to the adoption of DOJ’s 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) in 199260—the 
only available punishment was a criminal fine.61 Monetary sanctions 
remain the most common form of corporate punishment,62 with detailed 
criteria provided for calculating them.63 The Guidelines are advisory 
 
 56. Laufer, supra note 12, at 1420; see Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 20, at 742 (describing 
the DOJ’s sentencing guidelines as a “composite liability regime”). 
 57. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018); U.S. 
ATT’YS’ MANUAL, supra note 30, § 9-28.800.  
 58. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(c); U.S. ATT’YS’ MANUAL, supra note 30, 
§ 9-28.600. 
 59. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(b); U.S. ATT’YS’ MANUAL, supra note 30, 
§ 9-28.500. 
 60. See Garrett, supra note 39, at 877–81 (discussing the limited appearance of nonmonetary 
sanctions leading up to adoption of the Guidelines). 
 61. See United States v. A&P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 127 (1958). 
 62. Sentencing Sourcebook, supra note 43, at tbl.51 (observing 74.8 percent of offenders 
receiving a fine, with an additional 12.2 percent receiving restitution but no fine). Despite being 
included in the Guidelines, restitution is not punishment. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
ch. 8, pt. B, introductory cmt. 
 63. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8C1.1–8C4.11. 
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both generally64 and especially with respect to prosecution agreements 
that do not result in a criminal sentence.65 In practice, however, they 
continue to carry great weight in providing a benchmark for most 
monetary sanctions imposed.66 To that point, Cindy Alexander and 
Mark Cohen find that “no clear difference emerges between the 
monetary sanctions imposed through” prosecution agreements as 
compared to guilty pleas.67 At the extreme, the Guidelines allow for 
fines large enough to forcibly terminate a criminal corporation. 
Specifically, where an organization is found to have “operated primarily 
for a criminal purpose or primarily by criminal means,” the Guidelines 
require a sentencing court to impose a fine calculated “to divest [an] 
organization of all its net assets.”68 
2. Nonmonetary Sanctions 
Since the mid-1990s, and increasingly in the past decade, 
monetary fines have been complemented by nonmonetary sanctions—
chiefly, compliance and corporate-governance reforms imposed either 
as a condition of probation or as part of a settlement agreement.69 
Whether in the courtroom or the prosecutor’s office, the government has 
exercised broad authority to fashion penalties directly impacting a 
corporation’s internal organization and future activities.70  
This Section begins by detailing the nonmonetary sanctions 
under the Guidelines. The Guidelines allow, and in some circumstances 
require, that a sentencing court impose a term of probation of up to five 
 
 64. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005). 
 65. Courts formally have a role with respect to DPAs, but to date that oversight power has 
been construed extremely narrowly. United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 741 (D.C. 
Cir. 2016); see United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2017). Courts 
do not play a role with respect to NPAs. 
 66. Most, but not all. For example, the Guidelines do not apply to environmental crimes with 
respect to fines but do apply with respect to restitution. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 8C2.1 cmt. 2 (fines); id. § 8A1.1 (restitution); see id. app. B (collecting sentencing statutes, some 
of which supersede the Guidelines). 
 67. Alexander & Cohen, supra note 26, at 583. 
 68. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C1.1.  
 69. Baer, supra note 30, at 972–75 (discussing the development of compliance as a function 
of criminal law). For discussions of criminal law’s impact on the compliance industry writ large, 
see Griffith, supra note 30, at 2133; and Veronica Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, 102 
CORNELL L. REV. 1003 (2017).  
 70. As further incentive, both charging decisions and the magnitude of a Guidelines-
calculated fine consider whether the defendant had an effective compliance program at the time 
of the alleged offense. See supra note 57; see also Miriam H. Baer, When the Corporation 
Investigates Itself, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING 
308, 313 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2018) (“[T]he Federal Principles all but require the publicly held 
corporation’s implementation of a compliance function.”). 
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years.71 Probation is not nearly as common as fines; the Sentencing 
Commission reports that approximately one-third of sentences omit it.72 
The Guidelines identify recommended conditions of probation—most 
importantly, the creation of an “effective compliance and ethics 
program.”73 Additionally, courts have open-ended authority to impose 
bespoke conditions of probation that “are reasonably related to the 
nature and circumstances of the offense or the history and 
characteristics of the organization.”74 Buttressed by a deferential abuse 
of discretion standard of review, a court’s “opportunity to remedy 
corporate misbehavior through . . . probation is almost endless.”75 That 
said, courts generally turn to a core set of policing measures whereby 
convicted corporations are routinely ordered to create a compliance 
program or revise a preexisting one.76 With respect to these compliance-
program reforms, a common set of changes recur frequently: creation of 
an ethics hotline or ombudsperson to facilitate internal whistleblowing, 
mandatory compliance training, and revisions to the defendant’s 
auditing procedures.77  
The frequency, breadth, and specificity of policing measures are 
greater in prosecution agreements than in guilty pleas. The DOJ has 
mostly been reluctant to announce clear guidelines for structuring 
agreements.78 Nevertheless, general patterns have been discerned. For 
one, the aforementioned reforms that arise as conditions of probation 
are also common to prosecution agreements.79 For another, corporations 
also agree to participate in and assist in any ongoing investigation, 
including and especially by helping to build the prosecution’s or 
regulator’s case against the corporation’s own employees.80 
Compared with guilty pleas, prosecution agreements reliably go 
further in imposing compliance changes that get closer to core issues of 
 
 71. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.1(a)(6) (requiring corporate probation “to 
ensure that changes are made within the organization to reduce the likelihood of future criminal 
conduct”). 
 72. Sentencing Sourcebook, supra note 43, at tbl.53. 
 73. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D.1.4; see id. § 8B2.1 (providing principles for 
an “effective” program). Other conditions include restitution, community service, and a “condition 
that the organization not commit another . . . crime during the term of probation.” Id. § 8D13. 
 74. Id. § 8D1.3(c). 
 75. Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Criminal Liability: When Does It Make Sense?, 46 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1437, 1439 (2009). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Griffith, supra note 30, at 2089. 
 78. Henning, supra note 13, at 1433. 
 79. Garrett, supra note 39, at 894. 
 80. Lisa K. Griffin, Inside-Out Enforcement, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 
31, at 110–13; see Elizabeth E. Joh & Thomas W. Joo, The Corporation as Snitch: The New DOJ 
Guidelines on Prosecuting White Collar Crime, 101 VA. L. REV. 51 (2015). 
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corporate governance that were traditionally the purview of corporate 
law.81 For example, the terms of various prosecution agreements have 
prohibited corporations from pursuing specific lines of business, from 
continuing certain business practices, from associating with specific 
clients or counterparties, and even from participating in whole 
industries. One recent study finds that approximately one-third of 
prosecution agreements imposed explicit prohibitions on a corporation’s 
business practices.82 By way of illustration, the global auditing firm 
KPMG agreed to “cease its private client tax practice” as part of its 
DPA.83 Some prosecution agreement signatories have had to “refrain 
from doing any new projects” with specified counterparties,84 while 
others were forced to adopt certain practices or relationships.85  
Beyond these bright-line prohibitions, further changes touch 
directly on other aspects of corporate governance that are traditionally 
left to private ordering. Some reforms focus on management by creating 
new officer positions with reporting authority to the corporation’s 
board, changing compensation policies, and incorporating clawback 
procedures.86 Other popular changes focus instead on restructuring the 
corporation’s board of directors: removing specific directors, installing 
seats for new independent directors, creating compliance and audit 
committees, and altering election procedures.87  
Finally, prosecution agreements frequently impose a corporate 
monitor with broad investigative and reporting powers.88 The oversight 
and enforcement powers for any given corporate monitor vary widely 
across prosecution agreements; this variance is further complicated by 
 
 81. Griffith, supra note 30, at 2078. 
 82. Kaal & Lacine, supra note 22, at 52; see also Alexander & Cohen, supra note 26, at 589 
(finding that twelve percent of a sample of 156 NPAs and DPAs included instructions to “shut 
down or divest[ ]” a business unit, and a further twenty-eight percent required “other business 
changes”). 
 83. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 4–6, United States v. KPMG LLP, No. 1:05-cr-00903 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2005), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/ 
agreements/kpmg.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4AE-WJUN].  
 84. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Ala. Contract Sales, Inc., No. 2:07-cr-
00222 (N.D. Ala. May 29, 2007), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/ 
agreements/alabamacontractsales.pdf [https://perma.cc/27JU-VV75]. 
 85. Non-Prosecution Agreement, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 3 (Dec. 6, 2011), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/ 
Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/agreements/alphanatural.pdf [https://perma.cc/556U-
D894] (requiring construction of safety-testing facilities). 
 86. Griffith, supra note 30, at 2089. 
 87. Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation Through 
Nonprosecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 336–37 (2017). 
 88. Memorandum from Lanny A. Breur, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All 
Criminal Div. Persons, Re: Selection of Monitors in Criminal Division Matters (June 24, 2009), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2012/11/14/response3-supp-appx-
3.pdf [https://perma.cc/95KT-QUK3]. A few courts have recently begun to follow the lead of 
prosecutors in appointing monitors. See Alexander & Cohen, supra note 26, at 589–90. 
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the fact that many prosecution agreements do little to spell out the 
monitor’s precise relationship and function. That said, the authority 
available can be quite robust; at least some corporate monitors have 
been granted extremely broad discretion to oversee a corporation’s 
affairs, including by “restructuring [its] internal processes” and even by 
making “important and day-to-day decisions” on behalf of the 
corporation.89  
3. Collateral Consequences 
Beyond those directly imposed by the criminal justice system, 
there are serious consequences that follow from criminal proceedings: 
market losses and reputational harms, parallel or follow-on regulatory 
investigations, and private litigation, among other things.90 For our 
purposes, the focus here will be on “formal” collateral consequences—
viz., those that “attach by express operation of law” on the basis of a 
conviction rather than through a sentence or prosecution agreement.91 
Structurally, formal consequences apply automatically to a 
convicted corporation, subject to any regulatory agency’s discretion to 
waive the consequences. Substantively, these consequences usually 
involve disbarment from a federal program, revocation or denial of a 
license to do business, or exclusion from taking advantage of 
government benefits. For example, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) allows “well-known seasoned issuers” and certain 
types of offerings to proceed without satisfying the full notification and 
disclosure requirements ordinarily required under federal securities 
law;92 however, “bad actors,” including any person convicted of a felony, 
are prohibited from participating unless first securing a waiver from 
the agency.93 Comparable consequences exist throughout the 
accounting, securities, and banking sectors;94 for market participants in 
 
 89. Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 14, at 1724. 
 90. See Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the Preventive State, 91 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 301 (2015). 
 91. Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (2013); 
accord Zachary Hoskins, Criminalization and the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, 11 CRIM. 
L. & PHIL. 625, 625 (2017). 
 92. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 227.100 (2018) (crowdfunding exemption); 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2018) 
(WKSI ineligibility); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b) (2018) (Regulation D exemption). 
 93. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(d) (2018); Urska Velikonja, Waiving Disqualification: When Do 
Securities Violators Receive a Reprieve, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1081, 1090 n.45 (2015); Process for 
Requesting Waivers of “Bad Actor” Disqualification Under Rule 262 of Regulation A and Rules 505 
and 506 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/ 
corpfin/guidance/262-505-waiver.htm (last modified Mar. 13, 2015) [https://perma.cc/6YTX-
2BKM]. 
 94. Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a)(2) (2012); Securities Act of 1933, 15 
U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2012); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. 
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federal healthcare programs;95 in government contracting;96 and other 
areas.97  
C. Standard Theories of Corporate Punishment 
Criminal law and theory have long recognized a host of 
principles that justify and constrain the government’s authority to 
impose harm in the form of punishment.98 These traditional 
justifications are codified in federal law as follows: deterrence (“to afford 
adequate deterrence”), rehabilitation (“to provide the defendant with 
needed educational or vocational training”), incapacitation (“to protect 
the public from further crimes”), expression of communal condemnation 
(“to promote respect for the law”), and retribution (“to provide just 
punishment for the offense” that is “not greater than necessary”).99  
Federal punishment is pluralistic in that no single justification 
need apply in all circumstances, nor must any given punishment 
express or vindicate every justification all at once.100 However, the 
criminal law of corporations differs—in practice if not in law—from the 
rest of criminal punishment in that some of these textbook justifications 
are taken to be categorically inapplicable to criminal corporations. 
Deterrence, condemnation, and, lately, rehabilitation loom large; 
retribution is actively rejected, while incapacitation is effectively 
ignored.101  
 
§ 201.102(e)(2) (2018) (prohibiting convicted accounting firms from advising publicly traded 
companies). 
 95. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a) (2012) (mandatory-exclusion provision); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.101 
(2018) (identifying scope of mandatory-exclusion provisions). 
 96. 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2(a) (2018) (debarment); 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-1(a) (2018) (identifying 
factors to consider in whether to grant excusal from debarment); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1368(a) (2012) 
(mandating debarment upon a conviction under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2012)). 
 97. See National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of Conviction, COUNCIL ST. GOV’TS 
JUST. CTR., https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/database/results/?jurisdiction=225&consequence_ 
category=&narrow_category=&triggering_offense_category=&consequence_type=&duration_cate
gory=&page_number=1 (last visited Jan. 1, 2019) [https://perma.cc/3Z4A-9QM8]. 
 98. One consideration not viewed as relevant by the criminal law is the suffering experienced 
by innocent, nonculpable third parties as a result of the fact of conviction and punishment of a 
guilty party. See U.S. ATT’YS’ MANUAL, supra note 30, § 9-28.1100 cmt. b (2015) (“Almost every 
conviction of a corporation, like almost every conviction of an individual, will have an impact on 
innocent third parties.”); Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 349 (2003). 
 99. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012). 
 100. Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 326 (2011) (“[A] particular purpose may apply 
differently, or even not at all, depending on the kind of sentence under consideration.”). 
 101. See Uhlmann, supra note 46, at 1299. 
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1. Retributive Theories of Punishment 
Retribution, like incapacitation, is broadly thought not to carry 
over from the individual context to include corporate punishment. The 
retributivist impulse in criminal law regards as a central feature—or at 
least a necessary one—that a convicted criminal receives some version 
of her “just deserts.”102 But whereas retributivism has varied in 
prominence and importance for individual punishment over the 
decades, corporate criminal law has steadfastly maintained the “virtual 
elimination of retribution as an acknowledged goal of [corporate] 
criminal sanctioning.”103  
Driving retribution’s exclusion from corporate punishment is a 
heavy emphasis on the moral requirements underpinning the 
justification—requirements not met, on most accounts, by 
corporations.104 And to be sure, the majority consensus in law and legal 
scholarship is that retribution cannot and does not apply to corporate 
punishment. That said, the received wisdom has long been, and 
continues to be, hotly contested.105 To illustrate, some scholars argue 
that corporations can in fact satisfy the stringent prerequisites for 
moral agency.106 Others argue that the criminal law should vindicate 
folk judgments of collective responsibility.107 And still others offer a 
 
 102. See generally John Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238 (1979) 
(describing nine theories of retributive justice, all of which involve elements of “just deserts”). 
 103. Regina A. Robson, Crime and Punishment: Rehabilitating Retribution as a Justification 
for Organizational Criminal Liability, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 109, 121 (2010). 
 104. See supra note 9 (collecting sources); see also MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A 
GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 614–17 (1997) (outlining “the criminal law’s 
metaphysical presupposition of what persons must be like”); Michael McKenna, Collective 
Responsibility and an Agent Meaning Theory, 30 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 16, 23–29 (2006) (arguing 
that without “a sophisticated interpretive framework of action assessment,” corporations cannot 
satisfy the requirements of morally responsible agents); Amy J. Sepinwall, Guilty by Proxy: 
Expanding the Boundaries of Responsibility in the Face of Corporate Crime, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 411, 
428–30 (2012) (“There is good reason for skepticism about the corporation’s moral agency, not least 
of all because moral agency at least arguably requires a capacity for the moral emotion, and it is 
doubtful that the corporation possesses this capacity.”). 
 105. See PETER FRENCH, Punishing the Criminal Corporation, in COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY 190 (1984) (noting the variety of compelling theories surrounding corporate 
punishment); CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN, AND 
STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS 153–69 (2011). 
 106. E.g., Gunnar Björnsson & Kendy Hess, Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive 
Attitudes of Corporate Agents, 94 PHIL. & PHENOMOLOGICAL RES. 273, 273–74 (2017) (“[C]ontrary 
to what one might think, at least some collectives are [capable of its own reactive attidudes].”); 
Bryce Huebner, Genuinely Collective Emotions, 1 EUR. J. PHIL. SCI. 89, 91 (2011); David Silver, A 
Strawsonian Defense of Corporate Moral Responsibility, 42 AM. PHIL. Q. 279, 279 (2005) (arguing 
that “corporations can be morally responsible for what they do”). 
 107. See Mihailis E. Diamantis, Corporate Criminal Minds, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2049, 
2079–80 (2016) (discussing psychological processes for ascribing blame and arguing those 
judgments should inform criminal sanctioning); see also T.M. SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS: 
PERMISSIBILITY, MEANING, BLAME 161–62 (2008) (“[I]n order for such blame to have moral content, 
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deflationary account of criminal responsibility that appeals to 
principles in political philosophy rather than moral theory.108  
It is beyond the scope of this Article to solve, or even 
meaningfully engage with, the substantive dispute surrounding the 
propriety of corporate retribution.109 Nevertheless, three points warrant 
consideration. First, whether to exclude retribution as a justification for 
corporate punishment continues to be actively and substantively 
litigated. Second, the absence of retribution informs how other 
justifications of corporate punishment are defended, as described 
below.110 And third, the absence of retribution, while not fatal to our 
pluralistic institution of corporate punishment, puts pressure on the 
desirability of accounting for incapacitation.111 
2. Preventative Theories of Punishment 
Prospective justifications—sometimes lumped unhelpfully 
under the single banner of “deterrence”—are united by an underlying 
view that punishing prior bad acts is justified by and to the extent that 
it prevents future bad acts from occurring.112 Two prospective 
justifications, deterrence and rehabilitation, form the basis for nearly 
all discussions of prospective corporate punishment.113 The third, 
incapacitation, is nonexistent for reasons discussed in Part III.  
 
we need to attribute attitudes to these entities . . . to which our attitudes toward them are in turn 
responsive.”). But see Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of 
Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359 (2009) (arguing that a more “expressive” view of criminal 
sanctions aligning with folk judgments should be rejected). 
 108. See Robson, supra note 103, at 121; see also Levinson, supra note 98, at 346–50 (“[G]roup 
liability strikes many as objectionable because it seems to reflect an antiliberal embrace of 
communal responsibility.”). 
 109. For a fuller account, see W. Robert Thomas, The Ability and Responsibility of Corporate 
Law to Improve Criminal Fines, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 602, 608–17 (2017). 
 110. See infra Sections I.C.2, I.C.3.  
 111. See infra Section II.C. 
 112. One might object that the ultimate justification for punishment here—for incapacitation 
specifically, but also for any prospective account—is not simply prevention but is instead 
something more basic. On this view, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation are not distinct 
goals or bases for punishment as much as they are different means or functions for achieving some 
more fundamental shared goal—for example, preventing future harm, making virtuous people, 
cementing a shared ethical life, or fostering cooperative interaction. This Article leaves open the 
inquiry into what such an ultimate justification for the criminal law might be. Consistent with 
common usage, see supra note 16, the discussion here limits attention to incapacitation as an 
“intermediate justification” of punishment. My thanks to Mihailis Diamantis, Alex Sarch, and 
Steven Schaus for various discussions on this point. For more on the distinction between ultimate 
justifications and intermediate justifications, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONS-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 73–86 
(1991).  
 113. See Julie R. O’Sullivan, How Prosecutors Apply the “Federal Prosecutions of Corporations” 
Charging Policy in the Era of Deferred Prosecutions, and What that Means for the Purposes of the 
Thomas_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 4/28/2019  3:14 PM 
926 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:3:905 
As a rough approximation, prospective justifications differ from 
each other according to the underlying logic or mechanism by which 
they purport to prevent future wrongdoing. To pin down the analytic 
distinction partitioning theories of prevention, consider a stylized, cost-
minimizing approach to corporate crime popular to corporate crime 
literature: a potential criminal offender (and an economically rational 
agent) may decide whether to commit a crime by weighing the costs and 
benefits—the prospective gain minus the cost of sanction discounted by 
the likelihood of detection—against law-abiding status quo 
alternatives.114 Put a slightly different way, this would-be offender has 
available to her some discrete set of alternatives to pursue and various 
reasons for and against commission, which she balances in deciding 
what action to take. 
Deterrence is concerned with how a person weighs her 
substantive reasons for action. That is, a deterrent operates by 
externally impacting how a person evaluates the actions before her 
without directly altering the substantive reasons actually possessed. By 
increasing the cost or the salience of the cost of criminality, the use of 
punishment purports to deter the potential offender (in the case of 
specific deterrence) and others (in the case of general deterrence) from 
future misconduct. Rehabilitation operates not by causing a person to 
reweigh her reasons, as with deterrence, but instead by changing her 
reasons. The impulse underwriting rehabilitation generally is that 
through appropriate punishment the state can change a convicted 
person into the kind of citizen who would no longer desire or choose to 
engage in criminal behavior. So, a successful rehabilitation may convert 
our would-be reoffender from a crass, Beckerian agent to an arch 
Kantian who finds the very idea of weighing reasons in favor of criminal 
activity morally abhorrent. 
Deterrence is the “predominant justification for corporate 
criminal liability,” particularly with respect to the imposition and 
calculation of monetary sanctions.115 The preeminence of corporate 
deterrence is not new; the justification has occupied this central 
 
Federal Criminal Sanction, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29, 43 (2014) (observing that DOJ charging 
policies have recognized deterrence and rehabilitation, as well as “warranted punishment,” as 
purposes of punishment). 
 114. See Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 
(1968) (modeling the economic cost of criminal activity); see also RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW chs. 7, 15 (Aspen Publishers 2014) (1977) (describing the law and economics 
approach to issues in criminal and corporate law, respectively). This model is in the lineage of 
Jeremy Bentham’s work on punishment, discussed infra Part II. See also Shavell, Sanctions, supra 
note 12, at 1245 n.53.  
 115. Hamdani & Klement, supra note 32, at 273. 
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position since the creation of corporate criminal liability.116 And the 
Becker-style deterrence theory described above provides an intuitive 
model for thinking about corporate crime inasmuch as it presupposes a 
level of economically rational deliberation about future plans that the 
corporate structure is plausibly well-suited for.117  
Although deterrence looms large in the context of corporate 
crime, the federal government has long rejected deterrence as the sole 
ambition of corporate punishment.118 Over the past two decades, 
rehabilitation has become an increasingly prominent complement to 
deterrence as a justification for corporate punishment. To that end, the 
Guidelines now justify punishment to “assist an organization in 
encouraging ethical conduct.”119 Likewise, prosecutors report that “a 
central goal [of corporate criminal law] is to rehabilitate corporations, 
to try to help make them better and more ethical.”120 
3. Expressive Theories of Punishment 
Appeals to the condemnatory force of punishment occupy a 
prominent place in apologies for the criminal law of corporations.121 On 
these accounts, imposing punishment functions as “a conventional 
device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, 
and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation.”122 Expressive 
theories of punishment (like expressive theories of law generally) stand 
apart from, but not entirely independent of, either retributive or 
 
 116. Khanna, supra note 12, at 1486 (noting that criminal liability for early corporations 
maintained an optimal level of deterrence); accord Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal 
Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 393, 423 (1982) (tracing 
corporate liability’s historical role as a “more effective response to problems created by corporate 
business activities” compared to then-available legal alternatives). But see Thomas, supra note 27, 
at 489–90 (identifying deontic considerations in early corporate criminal law). 
 117. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender 
Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1177 (1982) (applying Beckerian analysis to identify conditions 
under which corporations should break the law). See generally LIST & PETTIT, supra note 105, at 
81–150 (outlining quantitatively “some more demanding desiderata of good organizational design” 
and the effect of the desiderata on group attitude formation and processes).  
 118. Garrett, supra note 39, at 881 (“The DOJ has now firmly rejected an optimal deterrence 
approach to organizational punishment. . . . [T]he Sentencing Commission has already adopted 
Guidelines that reject optimal punishment.”). 
 119. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8, introductory cmt. (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2018). 
 120. GARRETT, supra note 21, at 47. 
 121. E.g., Buell, supra note 11, at 502 (“A message of institutional fault says something 
different than a message of individual fault . . . .”); Peter A. French, The Hester Prynne Sanction, 
4 BUS. & PROF. ETHICS J. 19, 22–23 (1985) (noting the effects of shame within criminal sanctions); 
Uhlmann, supra note 11, at 1259–71 (outlining “the expressive function of corporate criminal 
prosecution”); see also William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 505, 520–21 (2001) (tracing the growth of expressive theories of criminal law). 
 122. Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397, 400 (1965). 
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preventative theories of punishment; they are something of a halfway 
point between justifications for punishment.123 That is, an expressive 
theory of punishment places “certain regulative constraints” on other 
theories—it tells us, for example, why we deter the thing we deter.124 
Stigma provides an intuitive way to distinguish corporate 
punishment from civil alternatives, and there is evidence reflecting that 
this stigmatic distinction bears out in the market.125 That said, a 
perennial concern with expressive accounts in application is that the 
content of the expression is not easily determined.126 Expression, after 
all, is “conventional”: sorting out what a particular action is meant to 
convey itself requires an act of interpretation.127 To that point, the 
conviction and punishment of a corporation has been characterized as 
conveying a variety of commitments that the state ostensibly purports 
to hold: that no one is above the law,128 that “the group arranged itself 
badly,”129 and that victims of harm will not go unacknowledged.130 As a 
further challenge, these descriptions concern the stigma of corporate 
punishment generally. But different punishments can convey different 
attitudes. That is, actions rarely speak for themselves, nor does a 
person own the peremptory authority to say what attitudes are 
 
 123. In this respect, Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes describe an expressive theory as 
akin to “rules of grammar or logic.” Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories 
of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1512 (2000). 
 124. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 420 (1999) 
(“The expressive theory of punishment says we can’t identify criminal wrongdoing and punishment 
independently of their social meanings.”); Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic 
Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 618–19 (1998) [hereinafter Kahan, Social Meaning] 
(“Punishing corporations, just like punishing natural persons, is also understood to be the right 
way for society to repudiate the false valuations their crimes express.”). 
 125. E.g., Cindy R. Alexander, On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate Crime: 
Evidence, 42 J.L. & ECON. 489 (1999); Jonathan Karpoff et al., The Cost to Firms of Cooking the 
Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581 (2008). But see Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The 
Reputational Penalties for Environmental Violations: Empirical Evidence, 48 J.L. & ECON. 653, 
671 (2005) (“[R]eputational concerns are not a sizeable deterrent to environmental violations. 
Rather, the primary deterrence occurs through regulatory and legal penalties.”). 
 126. Susan A. Bandes, All Bathwater, No Baby: Expressive Theories of Punishment and the 
Death Penalty, 116 MICH. L. REV. 905, 916–18 (2018). 
 127. See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 
1664–72 (2000) (noting several different focal points through which one can explain compliance 
with legal rules). 
 128. See Uhlmann, supra note 11, at 1259 (arguing that criminal sanctions represent the 
expression of community condemnation and disavowal of criminal acts); cf. Ramirez, supra note 
44, at 917 (“Discretionary enforcement of law that conveys a negative message of inequality that 
some law-abiding citizens are less valued concurrently conveys the message that some citizens are 
more valued.”). 
 129. Buell, supra note 11, at 502. 
 130. See Henning, supra note 13, at 1427 (summarizing arguments that criminal punishment 
reassures citizens that the rule of law will be maintained).  
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conveyed even by her own actions.131 Moreover, a single punishment 
can serve to express different or multiple goals, such that merely 
describing the effects may not answer the further question of whether 
the state is acting on a particular justification. Accordingly, Part II 
turns to an exploration of what incapacitation is, what it seeks to do, 
and what message it conveys. 
II. INCAPACITATION AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR PUNISHMENT 
Missing from the conversation surrounding corporate 
punishment is any serious engagement with the role that 
incapacitation does or should play either as a justification for or a 
means of punishing criminal corporations. As a stand-in for this 
omission, a century’s worth of courts and commentators have felt the 
need to remark upon the impossibility of corporate imprisonment—that 
a corporation cannot be imprisoned,132 incarcerated,133 or jailed.134 
Sometimes the connection is made explicit: “Incapacitation is not 
applicable in the corporate context[ ] . . . since it involves the 
incarceration of defendants to protect the public from harm.”135 Much 
of the time, however, this reminder that corporate imprisonment is 
impossible constitutes the entire treatment of what is ordinarily 
considered a core justification for criminal punishment.136 
The inattention paid to penal incapacitation is not exclusive to 
corporate crime. Compared with other justifications for punishment, 
incapacitation has received surprisingly little attention as a matter of 
conceptual analysis,137 with Jeremy Bentham’s (brief) discussion of 
 
 131. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 123, at 1513 (“Expressive theories of action hold people 
accountable for the public meanings of their actions.”). 
 132. E.g., Brickey, supra note 116, at 396; Bucy, supra note 75, at 1439; Khanna, supra note 
12, at 1497; Gabriel Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty: 
Corporate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 797, 799 (2013); 
Michael B. Metzger & Dan R. Dalton, Seeing the Elephant: An Organizational Perspective on 
Corporate Moral Agency, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 489, 499 (1996); Mary Kreiner Ramirez, The Science 
Fiction of Corporate Criminal Liability: Containing the Machine through the Corporate Death 
Penalty, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 938 (2005).  
 Early decisions recognizing corporate criminal liability frequented this observation. E.g., 
United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50, 55 (1909); United States v. Alaska Packers’ Ass’n, 
1 Alaska 217, 219 (D. Alaska 1901); State v. Belle Springs Creamery Co., 111 P. 474 (Kan. 1910); 
State v. Ice & Fuel Co., 81 S.E. 737, 738 (N.C. 1914) (“It is true that, when the statute imposes a 
penalty of a fine or imprisonment, only the fine can be placed upon a corporation.”). 
 133. E.g., Peter C. Kostant, Meaningful Good Faith: Managerial Motives and the Duty to Obey 
the Law, 55 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 421, 430 (2010); Orland, supra note 47, at 60. 
 134. E.g., Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 14, at 1728; Uhlmann, supra note 46, at 1333. 
 135. Uhlmann, supra note 11, at 1251. 
 136. E.g., LAFAVE, supra note 34, § 1.5(a)(2). 
 137. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 17, at 3–38 (surveying the intellectual history, or lack 
thereof, surrounding criminal incapacitation scholarship); see, e.g., Mike C. Materni, Criminal 
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incapacitation’s essential characteristics doing most of the framing.138 
As a result, discussions of penal incapacitation tend to uncritically 
adopt either one of two working definitions of incapacitation: one too 
abstract to offer much in the way of practical guidance for this project 
and the other too narrowly focused on bodily confinement to capture the 
breadth and complexity of how criminal sanctions express and 
instantiate incapacitation as a goal or purpose of punishment. Part III 
diagnoses the shortcomings of these notions of incapacitation, advances 
a more comprehensive account of the root concept, and defends in 
principle the role that individual practices can play to inform corporate 
punishment. 
A. What is Incapacitation? Two Unsatisfying Answers 
The concept of incapacitation is curiously undertheorized. This 
is not to say that courts and scholars have ignored the acute moral and 
practical challenges surrounding whether and to what extent the law 
should incapacitate convicted criminals, especially when it comes to 
depriving individuals of their liberty—they have not.139 Conventionally, 
federal criminal law characterizes incapacitation as a goal to “protect 
the public” from a defendant—specifically, from the risk that she might 
pose a danger in the future.140 From this starting point, the literature 
on penal incapacitation centers around two overlapping inquiries:141 
(1) whether and on what grounds preventative detention can be 
reconciled with liberal commitments proscribing anticipatory 
punishment,142 and (2) how effectively the state can predict recidivism 
and whether doing so requires taking into account inputs—race, 
 
Punishment and the Pursuit of Justice, 2 BRIT. J. AM. LEG. STUD. 263, 294 (2013) 
(“On . . . incapacitation—I don’t think there is much to be said.”). 
 138. BENTHAM, Panopticon, supra note 18, at 173–76 (defining incapacitation as the 
“prevention of similar offences on the part of the same individual, by depriving him of the power 
to do the like”). See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 
AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970) (1789). 
 139. For an exhaustive literature review up through the mid-1990s of the topics identified 
here, see ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 17, at 3–59. See also INCAPACITATION: TRENDS, supra 
note 19. 
 140. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012); see also Fiona Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: 
The Invention of Supervised Release, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 998 n.268 (2013) (citing S. REP. NO. 
98-225, at 125 (1983)). 
 141. ANTHONY ELLIS, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 151 (2012). 
 142. E.g., Robinson, supra note 28, at 1429–35; see also Alan M. Dershowitz, Preventive 
Confinement: A Suggested Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 51 TEX. L. REV. 1277 (1973); 
Norval Morris, ‘Dangerousness’ and Incapacitation, in A READER ON PUNISHMENT 238 (R.A. Duff 
& David Garland eds., 1994) (discussing the difficulties and limitations of predicting the future 
dangerousness of criminals).  
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gender, age, socioeconomic status—that might themselves be 
normatively or constitutionally problematic.143  
Instead, that incapacitation is undertheorized means something 
more basic. As it turns out, discussions of the moral and practical 
challenges surrounding penal incapacitation pay little attention to 
what incapacitation actually is—or put another way, to what sorts of 
punishments “count” as instances of incapacitation and why. In doing 
so, discussions concerning incapacitation uncritically invoke, and often 
vacillate between, one of two descriptions of incapacitation: 
incapacitation as a restraint and incapacitation as imprisonment. 
1. Incapacitation as Restraint 
Abstractly, incapacitation, like deterrence and rehabilitation, 
offers a preventative basis for punishment—recall that the government 
is justified in punishing a convicted person in order to prevent her or 
others from committing similar crimes in the future. But whereas 
deterrence and rehabilitation seek to affect a person’s reasons for 
committing a crime, incapacitation seeks to restrain or otherwise 
prevent the person from acting on those reasons. On this account, an 
individual that has been incapacitated is one who “would choose to 
commit crime but is unable to do so,” and instead is deterred or 
rehabilitated if she “is able to commit crime but chooses not to.”144 Or, 
on Bentham’s classic characterization, incapacitation aims for 
“prevention of similar offenses [by] the same individual” not by 
influencing her “will” to recidivate but rather by “depriving h[er] of the 
power to do the like.”145 
This stylized account of incapacitation offers a useful starting 
point, but the fine-grained, reasons-based distinctions it draws provide 
little traction for making sense of incapacitation as a recognizable social 
practice. Viewed in abstraction, this notion of incapacitation is 
underspecified in a manner that risks overinclusion; sanctions that 
should not count as incapacitation might nevertheless qualify under 
 
 143. Compare PETER W. GREENWOOD & ALLAN ABRAHAMSE, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION 
(1982) (analyzing “individual offense patterns across states”), and Andrew D. Leipold, Recidivism, 
Incapacitation, and Criminal Sentencing Policy, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 536 (2006) (evaluating the 
effect of incapacitation rates on recidivism), with PRINCIPLED SENTENCING (Andrew von Hirsch & 
Andrew Ashworth eds., 1992) (collecting essays on the practical and ethical challenges of utilizing 
rehabilitationism as an aim of criminal sanctions), and Malcolm Feeley & Jonathan Simon, 
Actuarial Justice: The Emerging New Criminal Law, in THE FUTURES OF CRIMINOLOGY 187–88 
(David Nelkin ed., 1994) (arguing that the “traditional symbol” of “Justice as a blindfolded woman 
holding scales” is undone by the use of systems theory in criminology). 
 144. Emily G. Owens, More Time, Less Crime? Estimating the Incapacitative Effect of Sentence 
Enhancements, 52 J.L. & ECON. 551, 552 (2009). 
 145. BENTHAM, Panopticon, supra note 18, at 174. 
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this capacious and open-ended definition. Philosophers and criminal 
theorists describe this general problem of indeterminacy as a “closeness 
problem”: insofar as an act (or set of actions) can be described in 
multiple ways, defending a theory of the basis of any description risks 
privileging the description that supports the theory in the first place.146 
Closeness problems, then, concern begging the question. For several 
reasons, concerns about question begging loom large when discussing 
theories of punishment.147 For one, a single punishment is often 
simultaneously compatible with multiple justifications, such that 
merely describing the effects may not answer whether the state is 
acting on any particular justification. For another, which justification 
is implicated may depend on factors other than how the punishment 
affects the convicted person. Imprisonment, for example, can be 
understood to instantiate any of the core justifications for punishment. 
Incapacitation, then, may be salient in discussing recidivist-oriented 
“three strikes” statutes but less so in discussing criminal sentences 
imposed on a child.148  
Theories of punishment do not exist in a vacuum; an account of 
incapacitation may start with a few high-level, abstract principles, but 
it certainly cannot stop there. More generally, the concept to be 
unpacked should not be considered a free-floating, timeless abstraction 
when history and practice may ground the specific dispute by providing 
necessary context and boundaries to what would otherwise be an 
unmoored theoretical dispute.149 This reflects the specific observation 
that a punishment’s effects are not the same as its purpose; punishment 
that has an incapacitating impact should not be taken as conclusive 
proof that incapacitation is working as a justification.150 In expressive 
terms, more is needed to determine whether the state is conveying a 
 
 146. See generally John Martin Fischer, Mark Ravizza & David Copp, Quinn on Double Effect: 
The Problem of “Closeness,” 103 ETHICS 707, 707–09 (1993); see also W. Robert Thomas, Note, On 
Strict Liability Crimes: Preserving a Moral Framework for Criminal Intent in an Intent-Free Moral 
World, 110 MICH. L. REV. 647, 663–66 & n.99 (2012) (discussing closeness problems in the criminal 
law).  
 147. See H.L.A. HART, Intention and Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 113, 
123 (1968) (providing an analogy to the closeness problem through the Catholic doctrine of double 
effect, which determines when ending a life is morally acceptable and when it is not). 
 148. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 17, at 35–43 (identifying the centrality of incapacitation 
to jurisprudence surrounding habitual offenders). 
 149. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION 2–7 (2010) (defending 
nonideal theory in political philosophy). See generally DONALD J. HERZOG, WITHOUT 
FOUNDATIONS: JUSTIFICATIONS IN POLITICAL THEORY 161–217 (1985) (arguing for a theoretical 
“alternative to foundationalism”). 
 150. John M. Darley et al., Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 24 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 659, 676 (2000) (noting retributivist impulses dominate incapacitative ones as a 
basis for imprisonment). 
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message not just of criminal condemnation generally but of offender 
dangerousness and recidivism specifically.151 
2. Incapacitation as Imprisonment 
Contrasting the stylized, underspecified account of 
incapacitation as restraint is an overly grounded one: incapacitation 
means imprisonment.152 That is, many discussions of incapacitation 
take for granted that what is unquestionably a “paradigmatic 
affirmative disability or restraint”153 is thereby the only form of 
incapacitation—or, perhaps, the only form meriting attention.154 To be 
sure, it makes sense to scrutinize imprisonment. Practically, 
imprisonment has become the most common, or at least most salient, 
form of penal incapacitation. And conceptually, a distinct benefit of 
incapacitation as a goal of punishment is that it lends itself clearly and 
straightforwardly to an implementation strategy155—glibly (but not 
inaccurately), “[w]e lock up people in prisons so that they cannot 
commit any more crimes because they are locked up.”156 Imprisonment 
thus provides an uncommonly close relationship between justification 
and punishment. The goal of deterrence, for comparison, does not 
privilege or recommend any particular means of deterring behavior.157 
Nevertheless, there are two problems with conflating the 
familiar and the essential. First, treating incapacitation as 
imprisonment conflates the justification for punishment with the 
punishment itself. The point here is not that there are other ways to 
incapacitate beyond imprisonment; rather, it is a category error to treat 
 
 151. Leipold, supra note 143, at 555 (“[I]ncapacitation, like other punishment rationales, 
cannot be considered in a vacuum . . . .”). 
 152. E.g., Simon, supra note 19, at 18 (identifying incarceration as the only form of 
incapacitation recognized under “total incapacitation” models of punishment). 
 153. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 100 (2003); accord Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 104 
(1997); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960). 
 154. Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion of Targeted, Noncustodial 
Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 332 (2014) (arguing that nonphysical forms of restraint “tend 
to be both undervalued and undertheorized”). Representative of this phenomenon, William 
Spelman adopts the assumption that “offenders are only incapacitated while they are serving 
terms in jail or prison” for nearly all of his book-length investigation into criminal incapacitation. 
WILLIAM SPELMAN, CRIMINAL INCAPACITATION 4 (1994). 
 155. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 17, at 15. 
 156. Darley et al., supra note 150, at 660. 
 157. Leipold, supra note 143, at 542 (“[I]ncapacitation also has the virtue of avoiding many of 
the contentious questions that surround other punishment rationales.”). But see Jeremy Waldron, 
Lex Talionis, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 25, 26 (1992) (acknowledging the popular understanding as “doing 
to the offender, as punishment, what the offender did to his victim” (emphasis omitted)).  
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incapacitation and imprisonment as interchangeable.158 Incapacitation 
is a freestanding justification for punishment, according to which the 
government is licensed to use punishment in order to restrain or 
prevent a convicted person from acting on criminal plans or proclivities 
in the future. Imprisonment, by contrast, is merely one way that the 
government instantiates or expresses this justification. Applied to the 
inquiry at issue, it may well be true that a corporation cannot be 
imprisoned, but this fact standing alone tells us precious little about 
whether the justification for incapacitating a criminal corporation can 
or should attach. 
Second, myopic attention to imprisonment has a stultifying 
effect on inquiring into the breadth and variety that incapacitation as 
a basis for punishment admits in actual practice. For one thing, 
imprisonment focuses attention on a single mode of restraint—namely, 
isolation from a broader society.159 For another, imprisonment creates 
the impression that incapacitation is binary: either a person has been 
isolated from the broader community or she has not. Finally, 
imprisonment unduly fixates attention on certain physical mechanisms 
of constraint like walls and prisons—or, more generally, what Bentham 
referred to as “body operating upon body.”160 
*      *      * 
How do the shortcomings of these two accounts bear on corporate 
incapacitation? First, making sense of incapacitation’s role in the 
criminal law cannot be limited to pure theorizing or a sterile description 
of punishment’s effects. We need to further consider what the law takes 
itself to be doing, what actors in the criminal justice system believe they 
are doing, and how those actions are understood by the broader 
community. Second, an account of incapacitation must accommodate 
imprisonment, but not exclusively so; imprisonment is merely one type 
of punishment capable of expressing the state’s goal to incapacitate an 
offender. Third, and more generally, not only do multiple punishments 
instantiate a goal of incapacitation but in doing so they highlight a 
broader concept than these two accounts suggest. To produce this 
concept requires interrogating actual practices. Accordingly, the next 
Section turns to where incapacitation already operates within the 
 
 158. See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 6–8 (1955) (distinguishing the 
justification of a practice from the justifications for actions under the practice). 
 159. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24 (2003) (“[Recidivists] must be isolated from society 
in order to protect the public safety.”); Steven Shavell, A Model of Optimal Incapacitation, 77 AM. 
ECON. REV. 107, 107 (1987). 
 160. BENTHAM, Panopticon, supra note 18, at 185–86. 
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criminal law. Though virtually absent from discussions of corporate 
punishment, incapacitation plays a prominent role in individual 
punishment—not just in the case of imprisonment but also across a 
range of punishments. 
B. Excavating a Richer Theory of Penal Incapacitation  
This Section considers how different punishments—particularly 
execution, incarceration, and supervised release—express or vindicate 
incapacitation as a goal of, or justification for, punishing individuals. 
The list of punishments is meant to be representative rather than 
exhaustive; incapacitation figures into many other punishments, to say 
nothing of its role in civil and pretrial contexts. Nevertheless, these 
examples provide a foothold from which to excavate a richer account of 
incapacitation, at least as it concerns criminal punishment, than 
focusing on either a bare conceptual analysis or bodily confinement 
affords. 
Three takeaways are worth previewing here. First, there are 
different modes of restraint. That is, it is not just that multiple 
punishments express or vindicate a goal of restraining a person from 
acting on the recidivist reasons she (ostensibly) has, but more generally 
that different punishments can be distinguished according to how they 
restrain. Second, incapacitation is not just a “body operating upon a 
body”; the criminal law incapacitates through physical, legal, and 
technological mechanisms. And third, incapacitation is scalar; different 
punishments restrain to varying degrees. These takeaways lay the 
groundwork for making sense of corporate counterparts to the core 
instances of incapacitation, discussion of which is reserved for Part III. 
1. Restraint as Disablement: Lessons from Capital Punishment  
Punishment can incapacitate absolutely. This notion of restraint 
through disablement differs from isolation in that it does not remove an 
individual from her community; rather, it works a change to the person 
that makes her incapable of recidivating. Capital punishment 
represents the archetypal restraint through disablement: execution 
renders a person permanently, irreversibly unable to commit any 
crime.161 Insofar as its impact on an individual is both permanent and 
 
 161. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2767 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“Capital punishment by definition does not rehabilitate. It does, of course, incapacitate the 
offender.”). 
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maximal in scope, scholars have tended to characterize capital 
punishment as the only instance of “total . . . incapacitation.”162 
While characteristic of capital punishment, sanctions need not 
disable completely in order to incapacitate, nor is disablement 
operationalized purely through physical means. On the former, 
chemical castration and sterilization represent a long, dark lineage of 
punishments that incapacitate through mutilation, the stated purpose 
of which is to prevent the individual from carrying out certain types of 
crimes.163 On the latter, legal and technological restraints can render 
an individual incapable of committing certain crimes. For example, 
some crimes can be committed only by public officials; impeachment 
and removal, in this respect, disable (at least temporarily) a former 
official’s ability to commit this crimes.164 Analogously, in discussing 
pretrial restraints, Jennifer Daskal identifies a host of financial 
restraints applied so comprehensively that they render an individual 
incapable of “partak[ing] in a single financial transaction without 
government approval.”165 
2. Restraint as Isolation: Lessons from Incarceration 
Whereas disablement renders a convicted person incapable of 
committing some or all future crimes, isolation removes that person 
from the larger community, thus denying her access to the targets of 
future criminality.166 Imprisonment—and especially incarceration in a 
prison or jail167—is a paradigmatic instance of isolation and the 
“primary means of incapacitating persons found guilty of committing 
criminal offenses.”168  
As the discussion of disablement as a restraint demonstrates, 
punishment can incapacitate entirely. By contrast, isolation through 
 
 162. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 48 (1968). 
 163. See Priscilla A. Ocen, Incapacitating Motherhood, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2191, 2227–28 
(2018) (describing sterilization practices for incarcerated women); John F. Stinneford, 
Incapacitation Through Maiming: Chemical Castration, the Eighth Amendment, and the Denial of 
Human Dignity, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 559, 561–63 (2006) (exploring chemical castration laws for 
certain sex offenders).  
 164. IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 19–20 (1997); Marijke Malsch et al., 
Disqualification from a Profession or an Office: Nature and Actual Practice, in INCAPACITATION: 
TRENDS, supra note 19, at 172–76. 
 165. Daskal, supra note 154, at 361. 
 166. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24 (2003) (noting that recidivists “must be isolated from 
society in order to protect the public safety”); Shavell, supra note 159, at 107. 
 167. Here the term “incarceration” is used strictly to describe the confinement of an individual 
to jail or prison. Otherwise, “imprisonment” is used as a broad catch all for a range of activities 
coming under the criminal law, which includes but is not limited to incarceration.  
 168. Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1323 (2008). 
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imprisonment incapacitates only partially in at least two respects.169 
First, imprisonment serves to incapacitate only for the period of 
isolation; the restraining effect of prison attaches only to the extent that 
the person is actively confined.170 Second, imprisonment protects the 
broader population from future wrongdoing by ostensibly dangerous 
persons. This protection, however, does not extend to the prison 
population—prisoners are of course still able to commit crimes while in 
prison.171 Indeed, imprisonment not only fails to perfectly incapacitate 
but also has “something like a capacitating effect.”172 Certain activities 
are criminalized only in the context of incarceration: escape, for 
example, is a criminal offense that can be committed only by the 
incarcerated.173 Incarceration thus serves partially to prevent and 
partially to relocate prospective criminal activity.174 
Isolation admits of more variety than just incarceration in a 
state facility.175 House arrest, for example, is considered neither 
incarceration nor imprisonment for purposes of federal sentencing.176 
Even still, isolating someone from the population clearly serves as a 
justification for imposing house arrest.177 To that point, several courts 
have held that, outside of the sentencing context, forms of state-ordered 
confinement other than incarceration—including house arrest, 
confinement in a facility, and detention in an immigration center—are 
all tantamount to imprisonment.178 Meanwhile, even isolation from 
society is not an exclusively physical affair. Radio frequency 
identification, GPS tracking, cellular network monitoring, and video 
 
 169. See generally Kevin Bennardo, Incarceration’s Incapacitative Shortcomings, 54 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1 (2014). 
 170. Darley et al., supra note 150, at 660. 
 171. JACK P. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 58 (1975) (“All manner of crimes 
against persons occur in prisons, and few crimes against property are literally impossible in prison; 
so incapacitation is largely a matter of degree.”). 
 172. TED HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS REVISITED 76 (5th ed. 
2006) (emphasis omitted). 
 173. Bennardo, supra note 169, at 12. 
 174. For further discussion, see infra notes 279–286 and accompanying text. 
 175. Indeed, Bentham’s discussion of incapacitation arises in the context of his defending the 
imprisonment against the then-prevalent trend of “transporting” criminals to Australia. 
BENTHAM, Panopticon, supra note 18, at 185–86. 
 176. United States v. Marks, 864 F.3d 575, 581 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[S]entences served in 
community treatment centers, halfway houses, home detention . . . are not imprisonment for 
guideline purposes.”); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5F1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2018) (“Home detention may be imposed as a condition of probation or supervised release, but only 
as a substitute for imprisonment.”); id. § 4A1.2(b)(1) (“The term ‘sentence of imprisonment’ means 
a sentence of incarceration . . . .”). 
 177. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) (2012). 
 178. E.g., Ilchuk v. Att’y Gen., 434 F.3d 618, 623 (3d Cir. 2006); Rodriguez v. Lamer, 60 F.3d 
745, 749 (11th Cir. 1995). 
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surveillance are common tools through which the government achieves 
isolation outside of a prison or facility.179  
3. Restraint as Prohibition: Lessons from Supervised Release 
Finally, punishments can incapacitate by prophylactically 
prohibiting an individual from acting through the use of external 
barriers that neither disable nor alter the individual herself nor isolate 
her from the larger community.180 In this sense, punishments restrict 
either directly, by prohibiting an individual from engaging in otherwise 
lawful activity, or else indirectly, by requiring her to take affirmative 
actions without regard for her desire to do so.181 
Fruitful for comparisons to the corporate context is the extent to 
which supervised release has come to serve an incapacitating function 
with respect to criminal punishment. Supervised release serves as a 
replacement of and an analogue to the system of parole once used by 
the federal government and still used by many states.182 It allows 
persons having already completed a term of incarceration back into 
their communities while affording the federal government broad, open-
ended authority to impose incapacitating and potentially quite onerous 
conditions on release. Peter van der Laan describes this sort of 
punishment as “part-time incapacitation.”183 And indeed, although 
supervised release was initially proscribed from serving an 
incapacitative function,184 Congress explicitly reversed course three 
years later.185 To that point, commentators have since concluded that 
“it makes sense to analyze the system [of supervised release] as a crime-
 
 179. SPELMAN, supra note 154, at 305; Murphy, supra, note 168, at 1328–45, 1393 (cataloguing 
“technological means of control”); Peter van der Laan, Part-Time Incapacitation: Probation 
Supervision and Electronic Monitoring, in INCAPACITATION: TRENDS, supra note 19, at 109–10. 
 180. Alana Barton, Incapacitation Theory, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRISONS AND CORRECTIONAL 
FACILITIES 463 (Mary Bosworth ed., 2005) (“Less severe forms of incapacitation are often 
concerned with restricting rather than completely disabling [or isolating] offenders from 
reoffending.”). 
 181. Murphy, supra, note 168, at 1388 (discussing the cumulative effects of technological 
restraints to “wholly decimate the experience of ‘negative freedom’ ” (referencing ISAIAH BERLIN, 
Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969))). 
 182. 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2012); United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 56–58 (2000) (discussing 
the relationship between imprisonment and supervised release). Supervised release is not parole; 
there is no such thing as federal parole (at least not applicable to crimes committed after November 
1, 1987). Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 218(a)(5), 235, 98 Stat. 
1837, 2027, 2031.  
 183. van der Laan, supra note 179, at 109. 
 184. Mica Moore, Note, Escaping from Release: Is Supervised Release Custodial Under 18 USC 
§ 751(a)?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 2257, 2265–66 (2016) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2012)). 
 185. Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Shadow Sentencing: The Imposition of Federal Supervised 
Release, 18 BERKLEY J. CRIM. L. 180, 191 (2013).  
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control mechanism of deterrence and incapacitation,”186 noting that the 
criminal justice system’s practices suggest “the primary purpose of 
supervised release has been to protect the community from an offender 
presumed to be dangerous.”187  
Supervised release makes possible prohibitions that can 
severely restrict a defendant’s ability to exist in and interact with her 
broader community. Consider conditions enumerated in the Guidelines: 
A court can restrict a defendant’s movement.188 It can exercise fine-
grained control over a defendant’s professional life, requiring the 
defendant to work but prohibiting her from pursuing certain jobs and 
industries.189 It can limit a defendant’s freedom of association.190 It can 
mandate participation in substance abuse and mental health treatment 
programs, even if that means periodic confinement in a community 
center.191 It can empower probation officers to conduct random drug 
tests, to search an offender and her home at any time without notice, 
and to seize contraband (which includes property that ordinary citizens 
may legally possess) without process.192  
Further, courts may fashion their own conditions of supervised 
release, provided only that a bespoke condition is “reasonably related” 
to the penological objectives and “involves no greater deprivation of 
liberty than is reasonably necessary.”193 Fueled partially by a lenient 
standard of review, courts have interpreted this power capaciously. For 
example, some courts have required defendants to grant their probation 
officers unfettered, continuous access to all financial accounts even in 
cases of nonfinancial crimes.194 Conditions of supervised release have 
 
 186. Doherty, supra note 140, at 1020. 
 187. Paula Kei Biderman & Jon M. Sands, A Prescribed Failure: The Lost Potential of 
Supervised Release, 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 204, 205 (1994). 
 188. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3(c)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) 
(geographic limitations); id. § 5D1.3(e)(5) (curfew). 
 189. E.g., id. § 5D1.3(c)(7) (“[D]efendant shall work full time . . . at a lawful type of 
employment . . . .”); id. § 5D1.3(e)(4) (“Occupational restrictions may be imposed as a condition of 
supervised release.”); see United States v. McKissic, 428 F.3d 719, 725 (7th Cir. 2005) (describing 
a requirement to “maintain[ ] steady employment” as incapacitative). 
 190. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3(c)(8) (prohibiting contact with anyone 
“engaged in criminal activity” or “convicted of a felony”); see also United States v. Love, 593 F.3d 
1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (upholding the setting of a condition prohibiting a sex offender from contact 
with known sex offenders as consistent with Guidelines). 
 191. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3(e)(1). 
 192. Id. § 5D1.3(c)(6) (“[D]efendant shall allow the probation officer to visit the defendant at 
any time at his or her home or elsewhere, and the defendant shall permit the probation officer to 
take any items prohibited by the conditions of the defendant’s supervision that he or she observes 
in plain view.”); id. § 5D1.3(a)(4) (mandating periodic drug testing for all defendants on supervised 
release). 
 193. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1)–(2) (2012). 
 194. E.g., United States v. Gaynor, 530 F. App’x 536, 541 (6th Cir. 2013). 
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become especially severe for sex offenders. Courts have indefinitely 
barred offenders from, for example, owning or accessing computers 
(subject to relaxation by the probation officer),195 accessing the 
internet,196 and even possessing internet-accessible smart phones.197 
And while not punishments at law,198 a raft of state-level collateral 
consequences further restrict offenders. Geographic restraints on where 
offenders can work and live, for example, are so prolific that it has led 
to effective “banishment from a number of towns and cities.”199 
*      *      * 
Consideration of how incapacitation is evoked or instantiated 
across a variety of individual punishments affords a richer 
understanding than either a basic conceptual analysis or narrow 
attention to bodily constraint allows. It remains the case that, at its 
most abstract, incapacitation as a basis for punishment aims to prevent 
a person’s future misconduct by restraining her from acting on future 
criminal inclinations that she ostensibly entertains. But it is further 
the case that incapacitation admits of degree with respect to scope, 
severity, and duration. Moreover, a single punishment may 
incapacitate to widely varying degrees. Further, we can draw useful, if 
not hard-and-fast, distinctions among different modes of restraint: 
debilitation, isolation, and prohibition. And finally, while bodily 
confinement provides a straightforward mechanism for carrying out a 
goal to incapacitate, federal law also relies on legal and technological 
methods to do so.  
 
 195. E.g., United States v. Lay, 583 F.3d 436, 449–50 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Thielemann, 575 F.3d 265, 278 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Bender, 566 F.3d 748, 751–52 (8th 
Cir. 2009); United States v. Alvarez, 478 F.3d 864, 866–68 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Johnson, 446 F.3d 272, 281–83 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 884, 895–96 
(D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127–28 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 196. United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 620–21 (9th Cir. 2003) (collecting citations).  
 197. See United States v. Mizwa, 574 F. App’x 220, 222–23 (3d Cir. 2014) (upholding a fifteen-
month sentence against a defendant for violating his conditions of supervised release by, inter alia, 
obtaining “a cellular phone with internet access”); accord United States v. Wood, No. 1:11-CR-
0210-SEB-TAB, 2014 WL 4053925, at *1–2 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 15, 2014) (imposing supervised release 
that included the restriction and monitoring of smart phones). 
 198. Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of 
Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV. 
670, 703–04 (2008). 
 199. Daskal, supra note 154, at 330. 
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C. Why Individual Punishment Matters for Corporate Crime  
Drawing on this richer understanding of how incapacitation is 
expressed as a goal of criminal punishment, Parts IV and V will 
consider the extent to which this traditional justification could, and 
should, be expressed through corporate punishment as well. That is, is 
it sensible to talk about restraining a criminal corporation from the 
ability to recidivate in a manner that functions comparably to, say, the 
archetypal means of incapacitating punishments that feature in the 
individual context?  
Before turning to this comparative enterprise, this Section 
defends in principle the methodology underwriting this Article’s 
conception of corporate incapacitation in two ways. First is a defense of 
the premise that individual practices can bear on corporate criminal 
law—in other words, that we can analogize from individual punishment 
to corporate punishment. Second is a defense of the particular form of 
the analogy on offer. Comparisons to individuals should be evaluated 
functionally rather than focusing on the obvious, albeit anachronistic, 
difference between individual bodies and corporate bodies (or the lack 
thereof). 
1. Why Treat Corporations and Individuals Similarly? 
Appealing to individual practices is meant to isolate the 
important features of incapacitation. This is accomplished by 
recognizing that social practices constrain and clarify which sanctions 
that restrain are properly understood to express a specific goal—put 
another way, which of the restraints that could count as incapacitation 
do count and why. Crucially, to say that a punishment incapacitates is 
not to endorse the practice. The argument here is not that the way 
federal law incapacitates individuals is so exemplary that we should 
extend the same treatment to corporations. For my part, I am inclined 
to take the opposite view: we have decisive moral and practical reasons 
to drastically reduce our reliance on at least imprisonment as a method 
of punishment.200 Regardless, this Article appeals to individual 
punishment in order to canvass what the criminal law takes to be apt 
instances of incapacitation. 
But still, why appeal to individual punishment at all? Reliance 
on comparisons to individuals in criminal law reflects a fundamental 
commitment of corporate criminal law as a legal institution. Operating 
 
 200. See generally ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? (2003); THE CASE FOR PENAL 
ABOLITION (E. Gordon West & Ruth Morris eds., 2000) (collecting discussions). 
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within the background of the criminal law is a principle of presumptive 
similarity, which stands for a defeasible commitment to treat corporate 
persons the same as individual persons within the domain of criminal 
law and punishment. This principle is not new; it featured prominently 
in the reasoning of courts that first decided to treat corporations as 
persons for purposes of criminal liability.201 Nor is it unique to the 
criminal law; other domains taking corporations to be legal persons for 
purposes of rights and responsibilities share some version of this 
presumption.202 
In describing this presumption of similarity as a central feature 
of how the criminal law holds corporations responsible, this Article is 
not making a claim that a commitment to similarity is fundamental in 
any deep metaphysical sense, just that it is fundamental to the 
institution we happen to have.203 Extending legal personhood to 
corporations for the purpose of criminal liability does not mean that 
corporations “really are” persons, whatever work that equivocation is 
supposed to be doing.204 Our enforcement regime could have been 
otherwise: corporate criminal liability need not have been invented at 
all, or a separate, parallel domain of criminal law could have been 
created.205 Whether, on first principles, corporations should be eligible 
for criminal responsibility is an inquiry beyond the scope of this Article. 
My interest is considerably more modest: given that we have an 
institution of corporate criminal law operating on certain underlying 
principles, we should want that institution to function well. Relevant 
here, the prima facie dissimilarity with respect to incapacitation at 
least calls out for explanation.  
But second, similarity is not self-defining. There are all sorts of 
obvious and nonobvious ways in which corporate persons are different 
from individual persons—or, to remove a step of complexity, in which 
corporations are different from individuals. An important facet of the 
 
 201. E.g., United States v. Alaska Packers’ Ass’n, 1 Alaska 217, 222–23 (1901); S. Express Co. 
v. State, 58 S.E. 67, 69 (Ga. 1907); Tel. Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 52 N.E. 445, 446 (Mass. 
1899); State v. Passaic Cty. Agric. Soc’y, 23 A. 680, 681 (N.J. 1892); People v. Rochester Ry. & 
Light Co., 88 N.E. 22, 22–24 (N.Y. 1909); State v. E. Coal Co., 70 A. 1, 7 (R.I. 1908); State v. First 
Nat’l Bank, 51 N.W. 587, 587 (S.D. 1892). 
 202. E.g., Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2, 29 (2008) 
(antitrust); Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629 
(contract; property).  
 203. Rawls, supra note 158, at 6–8. 
 204. See generally John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 
YALE L.J. 655 (1926) (articulating a pragmatic approach to analyzing corporate personhood). 
 205. Cf. Crane, supra note 202, at 30–37 (decrying the embrace of a tort crime model of 
antitrust over a corporate regulatory model); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 588, 602–03 (2003) (discussing failed attempts to federalize incorporation as a means of 
reining in corporate misconduct). 
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criminal law of corporations concerns the extent to which corporations 
and individuals are treated similarly by the criminal law—and 
conversely, what sorts of reasons should “count” as bases to diverge 
from the presumption of similarity. After all, a presumption of 
similarity is merely that—a presumption. What matters for our 
purposes is not that corporations and individuals are different. What 
matters is which differences make a legal difference, and why. 
2. Why Take a Functional Approach to Similarity? 
This Article started by noting the prevalence of the assertion 
that a corporation cannot go to prison. Implicit here is a straightforward 
view about the similarities and differences between individual and 
corporate persons: corporations differ from individuals in that they lack 
a single body, and this difference should be reflected in our practices of 
punishment. What is wrong with this view? Why go to the trouble of 
identifying functional analogues between individual and corporate 
persons in order to take an account of incapacitation and argue for its 
extension to corporations? 
Part III considers several interpretations of what this rhetorical 
appeal to the impossibility of corporate imprisonment might represent. 
But, for a moment, the argument is worth taking literally as a foil for 
contrasting the sorts of similarity relationships the criminal law of 
corporations might take seriously. The functional approach to 
similarity adopted in this Article should be contrasted with quite a 
different approach that is the original sin of arguments: that corporate 
imprisonment is impossible and that this impossibility should have any 
bearing on how we approach the criminal law of corporations.  
First, both my account and the impossibility argument embrace 
some underlying similarity relationship. Second, both accept that 
impossibility is, in general, a reason for diverging from that principle. 
In its general schema: if it is impossible for the criminal law to treat 
corporate persons and individual persons similarly for purposes of X, 
then the law has decisive reason to treat them dissimilarly for purposes 
of X. Bigamy, as an illustration, is a distinctly human crime. Third, the 
argument from impossibility treats a person’s essential, biological 
component—viz., having a single body—not just as a difference between 
corporations and individuals but as a difference warranting a legal 
distinction. In the language of the similarity principle, this essentialist 
difference is a countervailing reason to diverge from treating persons 
similarly—namely, by rejecting the traditional justification of 
incapacitation as applicable to corporations (like we did with 
retribution). In opposition, this Article’s preferred approach is 
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functional: it focuses questions of personhood on whether the entity in 
question has “the capacity to perform as a person,” which, in the legal 
context, means that it can “be party to a system of accepted conventions, 
such as a system of law, under which one contracts obligations to others 
and . . . derives entitlements from the reciprocal obligations of 
others.”206 Assessment of personhood, on this view, turns on whether an 
entity has demonstrated its capacity to satisfy admittedly stringent 
conditions of effective performance—not on whether the agent 
possesses particular intrinsic, flesh-and-blood properties.207 
This fight between essentialist and functional approaches to 
attributing personhood is not new, nor is it exclusive to corporations. 
Which is to say, it is not as if we are approaching this issue fresh; the 
criminal law has had ample time and opportunity to grapple with the 
question of what makes corporations persons for purposes of the 
criminal law. By and large, those distinctions are functional, not 
biological. True, corporations do not have physical “bodies to kick” or 
minds that can intend, but these constitutive appeals to biology do not 
preclude the application of criminal law to corporations; we can make 
sense of mens rea and actus reus in other ways. Or, more accurately, 
these appeals no longer preclude corporate criminal liability. 
Throughout early corporate history, courts took seriously the legal 
relevance of a corporation’s missing tongue,208 hand,209 body,210 mind,211 
and soul.212 However, as I have argued elsewhere, it matters not that 
these sorts of arguments once held sway; instead, it is normatively and 
conceptually important that they once did and that they do not now.213 
Nor was this rejection an exclusively criminal law affair. Courts across 
 
 206. LIST & PETTIT, supra note 105, at 170–73; accord STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-
PERSON STANDPOINT: MORALITY, RESPECT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 23 (2006). 
 207. See LIST & PETTIT, supra note 105, at 173; SCANLON, supra note 107, at 162 (identifying 
a narrow sense in which collective agents can be held responsible). See generally MARGARET 
GILBERT, JOINT COMMITMENT: HOW WE MAKE THE SOCIAL WORLD (2015). 
 208. Bank of U.S. v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 92 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting); 
Childs v. Bank of Mo., 17 Mo. 213, 215 (1852) (discussing conditions under which corporations 
manifest assent to a contract). 
 209. See Copley v. Grover & Baker Sewing-Mach. Co., 6 F. Cas. 517, 519 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1875) 
(No. 3213), cited with approval in Salt Lake City v. Hollister, 118 U.S. 256, 262 (1886). 
 210. See United States v. John Kelso Co., 86 F. 304, 305–06 (N.D. Cal. 1898); Bank of Ithaca 
v. King, 12 Wend. 390, 390 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834). 
 211. McDermott v. Evening Journal Ass’n, 43 N.J.L. 488, 490 (1881). 
 212. Case of Sutton’s Hosp., 77 Eng. Rep. 960, 973 (K.B. 1612) (Coke, J.).  
 213. Thomas, supra note 27, at 438. Briefly, my view is that courts adopted a functional 
conception of personhood—one that replaced constitutive biological appeals with functional, 
external observations as the basis for making attributions surrounding actus reus and mens rea. 
See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1780–1970, at 50–65 (1970); Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The 
Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 208 (1985). 
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the country, when asked to make sense of the extension of some legal 
domain to include corporations, consistently rejected this sort of 
“technical[ ]” reasoning214 that required first looking to a corporate 
tongue, hand, body, mind, and soul in order to determine what the law 
would allow (or not allow) a corporation to do or what the law could do 
to a corporation.215 We see this trend, for example, in tort law and in 
contract law, both of which proved a conceptual prior for the eventual 
creation of corporate criminal law.216 
With respect to criminal law, courts eventually came to the view 
that it did not matter whether a person had a single mind with which 
to intend; what mattered was what a reasonable observer (especially 
twelve of them) could infer about a person’s reasons for acting on the 
basis of her prior acts.217 Put simply, courts embraced the idea of 
analyzing corporate misconduct in the same way they analyzed 
individual misconduct—by observing. And while the Supreme Court 
sidestepped the issue in New York Central,218 the states’ functional turn 
has been vindicated. Specifically, and comparable to those early state 
courts seeking to develop a genuine sense of corporate mens rea, 
sentencing courts and prosecutors have created a practice of corporate 
criminal liability that eschews vicarious liability and prioritizes efforts 
to ascertain institutional fault.219 
But corporate incapacitation might nevertheless be special. 
Corporate criminal law might be broadly functional in its approach to 
corporate personhood generally while also taking corporate bodies to 
still matter. Without arguing that essentialist differences might never 
be legally relevant, serious skepticism is warranted concerning their 
invocation in the criminal law. Put another way, the criminal law—to 
 
 214. Jordan v. Ala. Great S. R.R. Co., 74 Ala. 85, 88 (1883). 
 215. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Historical 
Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767, 780–82 (2005); Stephen J. 
Leacock, The Rise and Fall of the Ultra Vires Doctrine in United States, United Kingdom, and 
Commonwealth Caribbean Corporate Common Law: A Triumph of Experience over Logic, 5 
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 67, 76–78 (2006).  
 216. Thomas, supra note 27, at 506–14 (collecting citations in tort and criminal law). 
 217. See JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW UPON A NEW 
SYSTEM OF LEGAL EXPOSITION 256 (1892) (describing trends in corporate criminal law); Dewey, 
supra note 204, at 663 (arguing that the criminal law can identify “the absence or presence of 
[corporate] ‘intent’ . . . by discrimination among concrete consequences, precisely as we determine 
‘neglect’ ” for individuals). 
 218. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909). 
Embracing respondeat superior allowed the Court to skirt the tricky conceptual question by 
addressing only whether any employee intended to commit a crime in the interest of the 
corporation. Cf. Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation: A Study of the Model Penal 
Code Position on Corporate Criminal Liability, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 39 (1957) (“[B]y ignoring the 
problem, they have solved it.”). 
 219. Thomas, supra note 27, at 526–29; see supra Section I.A. 
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say nothing of other legal domains—has long been comfortable dealing 
with corporate actions directly rather than indirectly by first appealing 
to corporate bodies. Preserving the legal relevance of corporate bodies 
just for the purpose of criminal incapacitation, then, comes across as 
anachronistic at best and ad hoc at worst. This is particularly true when 
other approaches to corporate attribution and personhood are available 
to the law. Inasmuch as a workable alternative model already plays a 
central role in the criminal law, it is worth instead engaging a 
functional, pragmatic account of what it would mean to incapacitate a 
corporation through criminal punishment.  
III. INCAPACITATION AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR 
CORPORATE PUNISHMENT 
This Part brings together what have until now been distinct 
inquiries: corporate sanctions in Part I and incapacitation in Part II. 
Given a richer understanding of how incapacitation is expressed as a 
goal of criminal punishment, this Part considers the extent to which 
this justification could, and should, be expressed through corporate 
punishment. Leveraging our robust understanding of penal 
incapacitation, this Part demonstrates that corporate criminal law as it 
is practiced today could—and plausibly already does, but regardless 
should—pursue an agenda of incapacitating criminal corporations. Far 
from an impossibility, incapacitation proves a viable justification for 
corporate punishment. 
Section III.A demonstrates that the criminal law can or could 
incapacitate a criminal corporation. It is sensible to discuss restraining 
a criminal corporation from its ability to recidivate in a manner that 
functions comparably to the archetypal modes of incapacitating 
punishments that feature in the individual context. Section III.B 
grapples with the why: If corporate incapacitation is not just possible 
but practically straightforward, what explains its near-total absence 
from discussions of corporate punishment? Section III.B identifies some 
reasons why we might not acknowledge corporate incapacitation, but 
ultimately concludes that none suffice to justify our current, categorical 
exclusion. Section III.C considers the possibility that penal 
incapacitation as developed here might actually be better suited for 
corporations than for individuals. 
A. How to Incapacitate a Corporation 
Appeals to the impossibility of imprisonment notwithstanding, 
it is both possible and perfectly ordinary for corporate sanctions to 
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incapacitate corporations in a manner consonant with the concept of 
incapacitation this Article derives. To ground this discussion, the focus 
here will be on counterparts to individual incapacitation; this is meant 
to tease out and situate various modes of restraint that are imposed on 
criminal corporations. Moreover, at least some sanctions already 
employed are better understood as efforts to incapacitate, rather than 
to deter or rehabilitate, a criminal corporation. 
1. Disabling Through Corporate Death Penalties 
Corporate criminal sanctions can be imposed to permanently 
and completely disable a corporation in a manner that functions like 
capital punishment. Indeed, practitioners not infrequently refer to this 
range of sanctions as a “corporate death penalty.”220 First, recall that 
Section 8C1.1 of the Guidelines allows a sentencing court to impose a 
fine expressly calculated to “to divest the organization of all its net 
assets.”221 Like the death penalty to which it is analogized, forced 
termination is the ultimate sanction for corporations. Forced 
termination permanently and absolutely incapacitates the corporation 
from committing future crimes by disabling it from pursuing any future 
activities. Qua corporation, forced termination is thus a uniquely harsh 
and irreversible sanction. But it is not just that the effect of this sanction 
is to incapacitate the corporate entity by forcibly divesting it of all 
assets. Looking at the narrow conditions under which forced divestiture 
may be imposed, it is clear that incapacitation is the goal of the 
punishment. The prerequisites for sentencing an entity to forced 
divestiture—a court may impose it only against an entity “operated 
primarily for a criminal purpose or primarily by criminal means”222—
virtually rule out rehabilitation or deterrence as justifications. The 
animating impulse is that some enterprises are so pervasively corrupt 
that they cannot be expected to be abstain or reform.223 At the very 
least, it seems deeply implausible that a desire to disable pervasively 
criminal corporations plays no role in authorizing this extreme 
sanction. 
Forced divestiture is imposed sparingly; to my knowledge, it has 
been used only a handful of times.224 More salient among scholars and 
 
 220. Hamdani & Klement, supra note 32, at 278–79. 
 221. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018). 
 222. Id. 
 223. This point applies to general deterrence as well as specific deterrence. While termination 
ostensibly warns third parties, the conceit is that Section 8C1.1 applies only to the undeterrable. 
 224. E.g., United States v. Najjar, 300 F.3d 466, 486 (4th Cir. 2002); see also GARRETT, supra 
note 21, at 156–57 (collecting cases). 
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practitioners is the potentially existential threat posed by certain 
collateral consequences that attach automatically upon the fact of 
conviction. There is a somewhat muddled debate over whether the 
presence of regulatory consequences means that a corporate 
conviction—or, for some, even just an indictment—thereby collapses 
into a de facto death penalty.225 To my mind, at least some of the 
disagreement reflects a failure to disambiguate. On the one hand, most 
collateral consequences that attach to a corporate conviction, while 
individually costly to the enterprise, pose no catastrophic harm.226 A 
quick review of, for example, the SEC’s database cataloguing waivers 
granted for various securities-based consequences confirms as much: 
many current, well-known public companies were either denied some 
waivers or did not seek them for all consequences in the first place.227 
On the other hand, there is a small category of consequences 
that, for certain firms or industries, really do merit the moniker of 
corporate death penalties: Medicare exclusion rules for hospitals and 
drug manufacturers, Regulation D for hedge funds and major financial 
institutions, and debarment from government projects for defense 
contractors.228 These consequences have a similarly comprehensive 
incapacitative effect, as does forced divestiture. The common thread is 
that these existential consequences, rather than divest the entity of the 
assets it already holds, instead render the entity unable to access its 
predominant source of funding or revenue going forward. Here, Arthur 
Andersen remains the paradigmatic warning case:229 the accounting 
firm’s overnight collapse into bankruptcy is credited not to the formal 
punishment imposed (a $500,000 fine) but rather to Andersen’s 
automatic loss of its license to provide accounting services to public 
 
 225. Compare Richard A. Epstein, Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Trial: Lessons from the 
Law of Unconstitutional Conditions, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 31, at 38, 45 
(describing an “ideal world” in which “corporate criminal responsibility would give way to the 
exclusive use of civil sanctions”), with Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate 
Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1481 (2009) (contrasting with the notion that the 
imposition of criminal liability on corporations is sensible), Kaal & Lacine, supra note 22, at 70 
(noting recent large-scale plea deals “call into question the ‘death penalty’ theory”), and Uhlmann, 
supra note 46, at 1321–22 (recognizing the conceivability of “collateral consequences short of the 
corporate death penalty that could harm employees or shareholders”). 
 226. At least not in isolation. The cumulative impact of collateral consequences is a further 
question, relevant to corporations and individuals alike. See generally Gabriel J. Chin, The New 
Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789 (2012). 
 227. Division of Corporation Finance No-Action, Interpretive and Exemptive Letters, SEC. 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction.shtml (last modified 
Dec. 19, 2018) [https://perma.cc/ZCP5-NMUN]. 
 228. See supra notes 92–97 and accompanying text. 
 229. Technically, Arthur Andersen was a partnership, but for our purposes, the lesson holds. 
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companies.230 As a result, and because it was not granted a waiver by 
the SEC, the firm was disabled from continuing as a going affair. 
In short, whether through a fine imposed directly as punishment 
or a suspension imposed indirectly as a collateral consequence, 
conviction of a criminal corporation can wholly disable the enterprise in 
a manner evocative of capital punishment. To be sure, we should not 
take the metaphor too seriously: execution of an individual person is 
unquestionably a more serious affair than is dissolution of a legal 
entity.231 Among other things, employees, officers, and directors can join 
another enterprise, and shareholders are out an investment rather than 
their lives or their freedom.232 In theory, one can even imagine attempts 
to recreate the corporation just terminated.233 But neither should we 
dismiss the dissolution of a legal entity as a mere paper worry; forced 
termination need not reach the moral dimension of capital punishment 
to be especially severe. Continuing the example, Andersen’s collapse 
cost thousands of jobs, cancelled a broad swath of contracts and 
business relationships with a host of third parties, and reorganized the 
collection of major domestic accounting firms.234 Part IV revisits these 
concerns when discussing doctrinal reforms. But for present purposes, 
it is enough to acknowledge that there are corporate criminal sanctions 
capable of incapacitating through disablement. Moreover, an appeal to 
incapacitation arguably provides the best explanation for the goal being 
vindicated by the criminal law when it imposes at least some of these 
sanctions. 
2. Prohibiting Through Corporate Probation and NPAs/DPAs 
Corporate probation has emerged as an odd amalgamation of 
ordinary probation and supervised release. Meanwhile, prosecution 
agreements are increasingly being used to impose probation-like 
conditions, including conditions that interfere more aggressively with 
the corporation’s internal structure and daily affairs than have 
conditions of probation. Regardless, the effects function similarly to 
supervised release in restricting the entity’s ability to pursue activities 
it otherwise has reason to pursue. Consider three different types of 
 
 230. GARRETT, supra note 21, at 150. 
 231. To that point, many states reserve open-ended authority to revoke a corporate charter 
with little cause or process. See Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate 
Responsibility: Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1152 (2012) (discussing powers 
over corporate charters still reserved to states).  
 232. Mueller, supra note 218, at 39–40, 47. 
 233. But see Mihailis E. Diamantis, Successor Identity, 36 YALE J. REG. 1, 3–5 (2019) 
(discussing the impact of successor liability on corporate reorganizations). 
 234. GARRETT, supra note 21, at 40–44. 
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conditions that have an incapacitative character: limitations on specific 
business activities, corporate monitors, and compliance reforms. 
a. Prohibition of Business Practices 
Corporate criminal settlements, particularly prosecution 
agreements, increasingly require corporations to abandon lines of 
business and to stop working with certain third parties and begin 
working with others instead.235 On the one hand, the effects of these 
prohibitions are not so severe as permanent disablement; indeed, these 
prohibitions are presumably designed to avoid such an outcome.236 On 
the other hand, they have an obvious incapacitative, albeit more 
narrowly tailored, effect akin to conditions of probation constraining 
individual freedom of association and employment opportunities.237 
Moreover, similarly to forced divestiture, prohibitions on 
entering certain sectors, pursuing certain lines of business, and 
interacting with certain counterparties suggest that incapacitation may 
well provide the basis for and not merely represent a consequence of 
corporate punishment. Particularly instructive here is KPMG’s 
agreement in its 2008 DPA to exit the high-end tax business.238 KPMG 
agreed to a host of “permanent restrictions” on its tax practice, 
including exiting entirely from its private client tax and compensation 
and benefits tax practices.239 It is not that outright prohibitions are 
immune from appeals to deterrence or rehabilitation; the conceptual 
niceties among theories of punishment cannot be neatly cleaved at the 
joint when we get down to actual practice, particularly when multiple 
justifications can attach simultaneously.240 However, it seems contrived 
to say that prosecutors sought to rehabilitate KPMG into the kind of 
entity that could engage lawfully in this otherwise legitimate business 
by prohibiting KPMG from ever taking part in that business again.241 
The upshot here is not that incapacitation alone grounds this sanction 
 
 235. See supra notes 78–85 and accompanying text. 
 236. See Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 321–22 (2007) (connecting the rise of DPAs to “the public opprobrium that 
followed the Arthur Andersen case”). 
 237. See supra Section II.B.3. 
 238. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 83, at 4–6. As with Arthur Andersen, see 
supra note 229, the fact that KPMG is a partnership does not impact the analysis. 
 239. Id. at 4–5. 
 240. See supra notes 144–148. 
 241. But see Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, KPMG to Pay $456 Million for Criminal 
Violations in Relation to Largest-Ever Tax Shelter Fraud Case (Aug. 29, 2005), 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2005/August/05_ag_433.html [https://perma.cc/ZE38-
TE7C] (expressing hope that KPMG would continue to reform other practices). 
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but merely that excluding incapacitation as a basis for this punishment 
fails to fully account for the facts on the ground. 
b. Corporate Monitors 
Corporate monitors, too, can serve an incapacitative function. 
This is clearest in circumstances where monitors are given veto 
authority and sign-off approval, which thereby prevents the corporation 
from acting without first securing outside approval to do so.242 Indeed, 
Vikramaditya Khanna and Timothy Dickinson have noted in passing 
that installing a monitor could be understood as “a way to incapacitate 
a corporation from committing future wrongdoing,” even if monitors are 
not actually justified on these grounds.243  
But even without explicit sign-off control over day-to-day 
decisionmaking, the corporate monitor, like a probation officer, 
routinely possesses broad authority to oversee a corporation’s activities, 
including those outside the narrow inquiry into whether the corporation 
is complying with its prosecution agreement. Beyond the monitor itself, 
there are specific governance and compliance reforms being imposed on 
a criminal corporation’s structure to consider. Although couched in the 
language of rehabilitation, here, too, incapacitation operates both as a 
goal and as a consequence of the specific reforms reliably being imposed. 
c. Policing Measures and Compliance Reforms 
The panoply of invasive, compliance-centric reforms at least 
have the effect of preventing or restricting the corporation’s ability to 
act on its reasons without necessarily altering those reasons. These 
compliance and governance reforms are “policing measures” intended 
to root out and detect future wrongdoing.244 In doing so, the government 
rearranges a criminal corporation’s internal structure and 
composition—by, for example, erecting new reporting lines, 
departments, removing some managers, and taking away the 
responsibilities of others.245 Almost by definition, these changes are 
against the corporation’s self-perceived interests; outside of criminal 
 
 242. See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 14, at 1731 (stating that monitors can serve the 
function of incapacitating corporations as well). 
 243. Id. 
 244. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 56, at 691; see also Arlen & Kahan, supra note 87, at 353 
(arguing that “PDA mandates may be appropriate when, and only when, these more traditional 
liability regimes cannot be relied on to induce optimal policing”). 
 245. See Griffith, supra note 30, at 2133 (“A great leap is not required to go from prosecuting 
corporations as though they were real people to seeking to ‘rehabilitate’ them through 
compliance.”). 
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law, corporate law provides a corporation wide latitude to order its 
internal affairs.246 Nor are the changes expected to be profitable—quite 
the contrary, they frequently require costly investments in 
reorganization, staffing, and monitoring at the expense of other 
business opportunities.247  
Cumbersome mandatory reporting systems inserted into a 
corporation’s preexisting internal decisionmaking structure may have 
all sorts of penological benefits in the form of improved deterrence or an 
eventually reformed corporate culture.248 But at least one consequence 
is to impede the corporation from acting on its reasons. Further, at least 
some of the imposed compliance-centric policing measures are better 
understood by appealing to an implicit goal to incapacitate rather than 
the proffered goal to rehabilitate. For one, the mere fact that these 
governance reforms have an incapacitative effect offers at least some 
reason to appeal to incapacitation as an operating justification.  
For another, many policing measures do not actually seem to 
vindicate their purported goal of rehabilitation. The focus of these 
reforms has overwhelmingly been on installing or improving policing 
measures designed to make future wrongdoing easier to detect and 
prosecute.249 Looking at policing measures as a whole, Lisa Kearns 
Griffin argues that corporate criminal settlements are being used to 
design institutions that reflect a prosecutorial mindset toward 
compliance.250 At an extreme, they weaponize the compliance function 
into a “snitching machine.”251 In this respect, governance reforms have 
focused on making courts’ and prosecutors’ jobs easier, not on resolving 
the underlying cause of criminality in the first place. 
 
 246. See James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 
257, 260 (2015) (describing the “nexus of contracts” paradigm of corporate law and its limitations); 
Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges 
We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 673–76 (2005) (describing the strength of the 
Delaware system in promoting the discretion of corporate management). 
 247. See Griffith, supra note 30, at 2135 (explaining that it may be possible to create a more 
cost-effective compliance regime by aligning corporate actions with government incentives); Root, 
supra note 69, at 1003–05 (describing the regulatory burden of compliance systems).  
 248. But see infra Part IV. 
 249. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Prosecutor as Regulatory Agency, in PROSECUTORS IN THE 
BOARDROOM, supra note 31, at 177 (comparing prosecutors’ roles in corporate oversight to those of 
other traditional regulatory bodies); see also Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 14, at 1722 
(describing the corporate monitor’s role as a type of policing measure).  
 250. Griffin, supra note 80, at 110–13. 
 251. See Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking 
Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 72 (2007) (describing the 
mechanisms by which government entities can coerce corporate collaboration); Michael A. Simons, 
Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and “Good Corporate Citizenship,” 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
979, 980–982 (2002) (describing the conflicts of interest inherent in corporate collaboration with 
government prosecution).  
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Even in principle, however, policing is not a substitute for good 
institutional culture. The model of crime here seems to be that 
corporate wrongdoing is discrete and against the rules, such that a 
system of monitoring will suffice to stop the criminals.252 But this model 
is not universally correct; as Samuel Buell notes, many crimes done in 
the corporate context are not instances of “self-interested agent 
misconduct” but of “benefit organizations and are committed for that 
reason.”253 This is true for instances of pervasive institutional fault.254 
The model of certain ridesharing businesses, for example, is to 
flagrantly and repeatedly violate municipal licensing regulations with 
the hope of ultimately avoiding sanctions through legal reform and 
popular support against a previously captured taxi industry.255 Further, 
we have no illusions elsewhere that policing is a panacea for ending 
criminal wrongdoing; other institutional factors are at play.256 Without 
doing anything to correct the institutional forces pushing individuals 
(and groups of individuals) toward criminal activity, we should expect 
only modest results from policing. The lack of attention paid to actual 
governance reforms designed with the goal of fixing the roots of 
organizational misconduct bolsters the suspicion that appeals to 
rehabilitation are less genuine than might seem.257 
3. Isolating Through Corporate Imprisonment 
This Article has thus far sidestepped the main assertion in the 
argument against corporate incapacitation—namely, that a corporation 
cannot be imprisoned. As previously discussed, incapacitation is a 
broader phenomenon than imprisonment. With respect to a holistic 
understanding of the concept, this Article identifies several means 
through which the criminal law could, and plausibly already does, 
incapacitate criminal corporations. Still, the skepticism toward 
 
 252. See Arlen & Kahan, supra note 87, at 330 (describing the system of corporate criminal 
liability in the United States). 
 253. Buell, supra note 11, at 496.  
 254. See Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 709, 711 (2018) (noting the 
increasing frequency of corporate lawbreaking). 
 255. See Benjamin Edelman, Uber Can’t Be Fixed—It’s Time for Regulators to Shut It Down, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (June 21, 2017) https://hbr.org/2017/06/uber-cant-be-fixed-its-time-for-
regulators-to-shut-it-down [https://perma.cc/MSX6-C3QZ] (arguing that Uber’s competitive 
advantage was intentional illegality); Eric Newcomer, Uber Pushed the Limits of the Law. Now 
Comes the Reckoning, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/ 
2017-10-11/uber-pushed-the-limits-of-the-law-now-comes-the-reckoning [https://perma.cc/5W97-
RKEJ] (describing Uber executives’ unique temperament toward legal restrictions).  
 256. See generally MAYA SCHENWAR, LOCKED DOWN, LOCKED OUT: WHY PRISON DOESN’T 
WORK AND HOW WE CAN DO BETTER (2014). 
 257. See infra notes 306–310. 
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corporate punishment’s ability to incapacitate to the same degree as 
imprisonment—the paradigmatic form of individual punishment—
merits consideration. The concern here is whether there exist—or even 
could exist—analogues to imprisonment, whereby the criminal law 
incapacitates an individual by temporarily isolating her from a general, 
nonprison community. Consider two responses. First, criminal 
corporations could be isolated in a manner functionally similar to 
individual imprisonment. Second, the fact that this is not done suggests 
a new, more promising basis for diverging from the criminal law’s 
presumption of similarity between individuals and corporations.  
With respect to the proper form of a corporate analogue to 
individual imprisonment, incarcerating individual members of the 
corporation would not fit the bill. Even if there were a formal, extended 
sense in which incarcerating individuals might count as punishing the 
corporation,258 doing so would not thereby count as isolating it; the 
corporation could still go about its day-to-day business, could replace 
the incarcerated members, etc. Something that isolates the corporate 
entity itself from pursuing the business for which it is incorporated is 
required. 
But this description expresses collateral consequences. Those 
existential consequences that constitute a de facto death penalty do so 
by imposing a de jure exclusion from the corporation’s industry, funding 
sources, or clientele. In other words, they operate to temporarily isolate 
the criminal corporation from its ordinary business community. And 
with respect to criminal punishment specifically, one could imagine a 
court securing a comparable result by seizing a corporation’s charter for 
a fixed term, thereby suspending access either to the corporate form 
itself or to the collective goal motivating the corporation’s existence in 
the first place.259 Indeed, not much imagination is required: prior to the 
passage of the Guidelines, one district court sought to impose a term of 
imprisonment on a corporation by putting the corporation’s assets “in 
the custody of the United States Marshal.”260 While summarily reversed 
at the time, the breadth of authority since vested in courts to fashion 
 
 258. Cf. Criminal Fines, supra note 109, at 642 (distinguishing the imposition of collective 
punishment from the distribution of individual harm). 
 259. Analogously, many states reserve the right to revoke a corporate charter for serious 
criminal violations. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 284(a) (2016). That power, however, is effectively a 
dead letter. See Kyle Noonan, Note, The Case for a Federal Corporate Charter Revocation Penalty, 
80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 602, 607 (2011) (“The integrity of the law is challenged when a state’s own 
creation flaunts the very system that created it.”). 
 260. United States v. Allegheny Bottling Co., 695 F. Supp. 856, 861 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 870 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1989). But see United States v. Harford, No. 88-5139, 
1989 WL 21563, at *3 (4th Cir. Jan. 11, 1989) (holding that a corporation may not be sent to jail).  
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conditions of probation may put a repeat performance on legally 
defensible footing.261 
To reiterate, de jure suspension means de facto death. No 
business can wait around for five years without operating; employees 
will leave and third parties and customers will take their business 
elsewhere. Consider this a further refinement of the argument from 
impossibility: rather than understanding corporate incapacitation to be 
a conceptual impossibility, the claim is instead that it is practically 
impossible to only imprison a corporation—that is, to temporarily 
isolate a corporation in a way that does not invariably lead to its 
termination. 
 But even this presentation cannot withstand scrutiny. 
Individual punishment is subject to the same tragic dynamic: confining 
a person in isolation would be fatal except for the fact that the state 
reliably acts (if not as well as it should) on its affirmative duty to care 
for a person in its custody. In this respect, to compare our institutions 
of individual imprisonment and corporate collateral consequences is to 
compare apples to oranges. A more apt—and more plausible—
comparison is that a corporation isolated from its broader community 
even temporarily cannot survive absent state intervention to ensure its 
survival. True, the current institution does not function to sustain a 
corporation while it serves out a term of confinement-like isolation. But 
arguably it could. A robust receivership, or even temporary 
nationalization, might come close.262 One could even conceive of a 
system that paid employees not to abandon the enterprise during a 
period of suspension.263  
This increasingly fanciful discussion warrants a few 
clarifications. On the one hand, there is little reason to take seriously 
the above reconstructions as policy ideas; they would require a major 
investment in new institutions that would almost certainly be too 
expensive and too unwieldy to merit entertaining for any purpose other 
than a fetishistic commitment to treating individuals and corporations 
similarly. On the other hand, that is the point: the ambition of this 
project, and of corporate punishment generally, is not to recreate 
corporate versions of individual punishments for their own sake. 
 
 261. David Debold, Sentencing of Organizations, in PRACTICE UNDER THE FEDERAL 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 17.01 n.3 (2019) (arguing the district courts’ vindication after the 
adoption of the Guidelines). 
 262. See Fisse, supra note 14, at 1163 n.96 (describing “nationalization, receivership, 
dissolution, divestiture, and trading bans” as “rehabilitative or incapacitative tools of last resort”); 
see also Donald R. Richberg, The Imprisonment of Criminal Corporations, 19 GREEN BAG 156, 156–
58 (1907) (discussing nationalization). 
 263. Mary Ramirez has suggested something comparable under the guise of a corporate 
dissolution. Ramirez, supra note 132, at 974–76. 
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Individuals and corporations are different from each other in ways that 
our legal practices should reflect. As Section II.C argued, and as this 
dialectic bolsters, reliance on theories underlying individual bodies 
detracts from an understanding of which differences should be legally 
relevant and why. What is left is a narrowed, largely banal argument 
of impossibility—that is, it is not obviously cost effective, given viable 
alternatives, for the state to create an institution to carry out corporate 
punishments functionally equivalent to individual imprisonment. 
Arguments stemming from the impossibility of corporate 
imprisonment, in other words, have very little to say about corporate 
incapacitation. 
B. The Case for Acknowledging Corporate Criminal Incapacitation 
Given the functional account of corporate incapacitation just 
described, should we continue to exclude incapacitation, the traditional 
justification for punishment, from applying to corporate persons even 
as it plays an increasingly prominent role in individual cases? 
Arguably, there is no good reason to continue doing so. The prior Section 
lends itself toward two modest arguments in favor of elevating 
incapacitation into, or ending its exclusion from, the panoply of 
justifications available when considering the punishment of criminal 
corporations. 
1. The Exclusion of Incapacitation is Arbitrary and Ad Hoc 
Incapacitation should be extended to criminal corporations 
because there is no clear reason not to. This Article has identified 
multiple sanctions either within or just outside the criminal justice 
system—specific prohibitions on business practices, veto-capable 
corporate monitors, and existential fines being the clearest analogues—
that incapacitate corporations in a manner consonant with a robust 
understanding of that justification.264 Thus, there is no conceptual or 
practical barrier preventing the criminal law from appealing to 
incapacitation as a justification for these punishments, nor under the 
auspices of our federal system would appealing to incapacitation crowd 
out other penal rationales that might attach.265 Put another way, there 
is a straightforward sense in which incapacitation applies to 
 
 264. See supra Section III.A. 
 265. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2012) (stating that “the nature and circumstances of the 
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant” shall be relevant for purposes of 
sentencing); Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 326 (2011) (stating that sentencing rationales 
“may apply differently, or even not at all, depending on the kind of sentence under consideration”). 
Thomas_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 4/28/2019  3:14 PM 
2019] INCAPACITATING CRIMINAL CORPORATIONS 957 
corporations, and, at least thus far, arguments for a categorical 
exclusion have proved unavailing. On this line, we should include 
incapacitation because there is no decisive countervailing reason to 
exclude it. 
 Of course, this particular argument might strike some as 
merely a semantic point; if we can already impose these punishments 
without having incapacitation available as a justification, then why 
bother recognizing it? But if appealing to incapacitation is merely a 
semantic point—and as Part IV makes clear, it is not—then it is one 
that cuts in favor of recognizing penal incapacitation, not rejecting it. 
After all, the presumption is in favor of a single institution of criminal 
law, not one with arbitrary bifurcations drawn between the treatment 
of individuals and corporations.266 While that presumptive similarity is 
defeasible, we should demand a reason for deviation, not the other way 
around. 
2. The Exclusion of Incapacitation Misrepresents Our Practices 
Incapacitation appears to already be operating in the 
background to motivate and explain some practices as a justification for 
those punishments. To the extent it is, the criminal justice system 
should make clear whether and how it justifies the use of its limited 
authority to intentionally harm persons on behalf of the public’s 
interest.  
In suggesting that incapacitation is operating sub silencio as a 
basis for corporate punishment, what is on offer is an appeal to the best 
explanation: certain corporate sanctions can be better understood as 
efforts to incapacitate, rather than to deter or rehabilitate, a criminal 
corporation. As demonstrated, this is most obviously the case with 
debilitating, existential sanctions.267 But the point also applies to less 
severe prohibitions on continuing certain business practices or 
relationships. It even plausibly applies to compliance-centric policing 
reforms, in part because the stated rationale of rehabilitation seems a 
dubious explanation of actual practices—a point Part IV revisits and 
expands. 
This admittedly revisionist description of corporate criminal law 
practices raises the obvious response: Why think that corporate 
criminal law is being used to incapacitate when courts and prosecutors 
are adamant that any such sanctions are rehabilitative in character? 
To start, expression is a public activity; neither courts nor prosecutors 
 
 266. See supra Section II.C. 
 267. See supra notes 220–227 and accompanying text. 
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have peremptory authority to decide what any particular action 
conveys.268 The purpose that courts and prosecutors communicate 
matters, but it is not all that matters. This is particularly true given 
the widely shared, if specious, belief that incapacitation cannot sensibly 
apply to corporations; under these circumstances, silence is not only 
more understandable but also less persuasive.  
But, without psychologizing individual decisionmakers, there 
are good institutional reasons why at least prosecutors—who are 
leading the charge in trumpeting rehabilitation—might be wary of 
appealing to incapacitation even if they understood themselves to be 
relying on it. Prosecution agreements, after all, are civil agreements, 
and while this Article has discussed the ways in which they resemble 
punishment, prosecutors have a countervailing interest in not 
appearing to impose extrajudicial punishment without a trial and 
conviction.269 Jessica Eaglin identifies a similar dynamic at play when 
arguing that recent advocacy for “neorehabilitation” is broadly 
indistinguishable from total incapacitation.270 There, as here, actors in 
the criminal justice system have institutional incentives to relabel—or, 
probably more accurately, to mislabel—efforts to incapacitate as efforts 
to rehabilitate.271 Taken together, there is a confluence of reasons why 
incapacitation may not figure explicitly into justifications of corporate 
punishment, even if incapacitation is in reality operating as such a 
justification. 
Admittedly, the defense of corporate incapacitation offered in 
this Section is a modest one. Merely expanding the set of justifications 
to include incapacitation—that is, ending its exclusion—would likely be 
of little consequence beyond affording expressive clarity about what a 
given punishment is meant to convey. But even this result would be 
noteworthy. The fact that including incapacitation as a justification 
would not meaningfully disrupt the practice of corporate criminal law 
further undermines the settled wisdom that incapacitation of 
corporations is impossible. In this respect, doctrinal stability is a 
feature, not a bug, of this Article’s functional account of corporate 
imprisonment.  
Part IV defends a more aggressive agenda of replacing 
rehabilitation with incapacitation as a critical function of corporate 
punishment. But first: the status quo takes as given that penal 
incapacitation makes sense as applied to individuals but not to 
 
 268. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 123, at 1519–22. 
 269. My thanks to Miriam Baer for pressing me on this point. 
 270. Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. REV. 189, 222 (2013). 
 271. See id. at 199–210 (describing a series of “emergency reforms” that have created such 
incentives).  
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corporations. The next Section explores whether the opposite might be 
true.  
C. Are Corporations More Fit for Incapacitation than Individuals? 
Given the functional account of incapacitation developed in 
Parts II and III, it is first worth considering reasons in favor of a more 
startling, counterintuitive conclusion: that incapacitation is better 
suited as a goal of corporate punishment than as a goal of individual 
punishment. Part II identified both normative and practical concerns 
that occupy most discussions of penal incapacitation for individuals. 
But as it turns out, these obstacles may be less relevant or onerous 
when we switch from considering individual moral agents to corporate 
legal entities.  
1. The Moral Case 
At a fundamental level, incapacitation stands in tension with 
liberal commitments to individual responsibility that are core to our 
practices of criminal punishment. One need not be a thoroughgoing 
retributivist to see as a foundational commitment of criminal law that 
it punish someone only for crimes they actually commit. But 
incapacitation, even more than other preventative justifications for 
punishment, imposes harm because of the crimes that the criminal 
justice system anticipates a person will commit.272 That is, the central 
presupposition of incapacitation is that an offender will, or very likely 
will, recidivate. Incapacitation cuts out the messiness of free will and a 
fair trial to stop these hypothetical crimes—and, in doing so, does 
violence to the countervailing normative commitments to moral 
autonomy and individual responsibility that animate retributivist 
instincts in the criminal law.273 
No such ethical concerns attend to the corporation qua 
corporation, however, because the criminal law has rejected the view 
that corporations are objects of moral consideration. Accepting this view 
does not require adopting some deep metaethical commitments in favor 
of what philosophers call “normative individualism”—meaning, 
roughly, that individuals but not groups should make up “the ultimate 
 
 272. See Robinson, supra note 28, at 1432 (“[P]unishment can only exist in relation to a past 
wrong. . . . [D]angerousness describes a threat of future harm. One can ‘restrain,’ ‘detain,’ or 
‘incapacitate’ a dangerous person, but one cannot logically ‘punish’ dangerousness.”). 
 273. Cf. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 73 (2010) (“Incapacitation cannot override all other 
considerations . . . .”). 
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point of reference of moral obligations.”274 Rather, the claim made here 
is the flipside of corporations being deemed ineligible candidates of 
retribution.275 If the corporation is not an objection of moral concern in 
its own right for purposes of retribution, neither should it be for 
purposes of penal justifications like incapacitation.276 Deep moral 
considerations inform the propriety of incapacitation as applied to 
individuals but fail to attach to corporations as such. 
This normative distinction should not be read to imply that the 
government is thereby free to incapacitate corporations 
indiscriminately. Just because a particular ethical concern salient in 
the individual context fails in the corporate context does not mean that 
no practical concerns attach or that we might not be concerned for the 
individual moral agents who make up the corporation.277 That the 
criminal law takes individuals, not corporations, to be ends in and of 
themselves provides substantive content to the otherwise banal 
assertion that corporations should not be imprisoned. This should be 
the real takeaway from the rejection of corporate imprisonment. The 
practice is not conceptually impossible, technically infeasible, or legally 
unattainable.278 Rather, pursuing corporate imprisonment reflects a 
certain normative confusion over what institutions of corporate 
punishment are meant for. This is why corporate imprisonment, while 
not impossible, would be fetishistic. Absent some independent basis for 
creating such a practice, doing so would reflect a reflexive adherence to 
similar treatment of individuals and corporations for similarity’s own 
sake.  
 
 274. Dietmar von der Pfordten, Five Elements of Normative Ethics - A General Theory of 
Normative Individualism, 15 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 449, 452 (2012); see Thomas W. 
Pogge, Rawls on International Justice, 51 PHIL. Q. 246, 247 (2001) (discussing the view that 
individuals are the sole objects of moral consideration, whereas groups are valuable only 
instrumentally and not for their own sake (citing JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999))). 
 275. See supra Section I.C.1. 
 276. The same logic applies to corporate rehabilitation. Diamantis, supra note 13, at 542–44. 
Briefly, rehabilitating individuals implicates paternalistic concerns about state invasions of an 
individual’s autonomy and identity in a way that other punishments do not—namely, by seeking 
to change a person into whatever version of a good citizen the state would prefer her to be. VICTOR 
TADROS, THE ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 355 (2011). 
 277. See Alschuler, supra note 9, at 18 (“When withholding criminal punishment would leave 
the giving-receiving ratio out of balance and make selfish action more likely, society has good 
reason to punish.”). But see Buell, supra note 11, at 522–23 (“Legal imposition of entity blame 
inflicts costs that may undercut any benefits it carries.”); French, supra note 121, at 21–22; 
Thomas, supra note 109, at 617–24 (describing the unique impacts and costs of punishing 
corporations under traditional rationales). 
 278. See supra Section III.A. 
Thomas_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 4/28/2019  3:14 PM 
2019] INCAPACITATING CRIMINAL CORPORATIONS 961 
2. The Practical Case 
Setting aside moral considerations, there are reasons to think 
that incapacitation, as a practical matter, may be a justification for 
punishment better suited for corporations than individuals.  
First, for reasons discussed in Part II, “incapacitation and 
recidivism are two sides of the same coin.”279 But predicting individual 
recidivism is a fraught enterprise—not just morally but empirically. 
Despite a long trend toward incarceration, there is limited, mixed 
evidence that it is successful; more importantly, identifying reliable 
variables to predict future misconduct is and remains an inordinately 
difficult task.280 By comparison, there is reason to think that at least 
the empirical difficulties are lessened in the corporate context as 
compared to individuals. The animating investigative task central to 
the practice (but not the doctrine) of corporate criminal law is to 
distinguish cases of individual wrongdoing from institutional fault.281 
As a result, preconditions for recidivism are baked into this 
determination; showing that a corporation is guilty involves showing it 
is structurally suited to recidivate (and may have already done so).282 
Second, given the broader understanding of incapacitation, it 
bears mentioning that imprisonment may not actually be that great at 
incapacitating individuals. Imprisonment’s defining feature is 
isolation; it removes an offender from the general population, thereby 
preventing her from committing future crimes against that population. 
But putting aside circumstances like solitary confinement, isolation 
does not incapacitate in the way we have come to understand that 
concept as much as it relocates.283 Imprisonment does not necessarily 
prevent an individual from committing future crimes; it simply changes 
who her victims are—other inmates.284 One might worry that 
imprisonment is operating less to incapacitate individuals from the 
prospect of future criminality than it is to relocate these future crimes 
from civilian society to a prison society.  
 
 279. Liepold, supra note 143, at 543. 
 280. Id. at 543–50 (surveying empirical findings); see also supra notes 143–144. 
 281. See supra Section I.A. 
 282. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(c) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) 
(explaining how prior history of similar offense adds to the overall culpability score); U.S. ATT’YS’ 
MANUAL, supra note 30, § 9-28.600 (“Prosecutors may consider a corporation’s history of similar 
conduct . . . in determining whether to bring criminal charges and how best to resolve cases.”). 
 283. Bennardo, supra note 169, at 12. 
 284. GIBBS, supra note 171, at 58. 
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 Even if incapacitation is a mixed basis for imprisonment, 
imprisonment may appeal to other justifications for punishment.285 But 
while this might be true, incapacitation provides the primary 
justification for many cases of imprisonment: three strikes laws, life 
sentences, the Armed Career Criminal Act, etc.286 Taking seriously 
concerns about the shortcomings of incapacitation as a justification for 
individual punishment should mean questioning the viability of 
extremely long terms of imprisonment as a practice, particularly given 
the massive toll in human suffering they impart. And, as concerns 
corporations, the functional account developed to this point highlights 
that arguments from impossibility are not only legally irrelevant but 
possibly normatively pernicious. Rather than thinking about how to 
imprison corporations, we should understand the ability to incapacitate 
them as further evidencing that we should imprison individuals less.  
IV. INCAPACITATION AS A REPLACEMENT FOR 
CORPORATE REHABILITATION 
Merely recognizing the possibility of corporate incapacitation 
would do little to disrupt the status quo, because actions already taken 
through or adjacent to established criminal processes are consistent 
with incapacitation as a possible basis for corporate punishment. By 
contrast, pursuing an incapacitative agenda—that is, taking 
incapacitation seriously not just as a possibility but as a central 
justification for punishment—would improve current practices. This is 
because incapacitation provides a better basis for corporate punishment 
than does rehabilitation.  
Section IV.A demonstrates that an incapacitative agenda 
provides a suitable replacement for the role that rehabilitation 
currently plays. That is, incapacitation captures the same core benefits 
that rehabilitation, which has been promoted as a supplement or 
alternative to bare economic deterrence, is meant to provide. 
Section IV.B argues that incapacitation is superior to rehabilitation as 
a basis for corporate punishment. In particular, there are shortcomings 
of corporate rehabilitation as it is practiced today that are endemic to 
both the institution of criminal law and the underlying logic of 
rehabilitation in ways that corporate incapacitation is likely to 
circumvent. Taken together, corporate incapacitation captures the 
 
 285. But see Bennardo, supra note 169, at 11 (rehabilitation); Allegra McLeod, Prison Abolition 
and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156 (2015) (retributivism); Peter N. Salib, Why Prison?: 
An Economic Critique, 22 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 111 (2017) (deterrence). 
 286. Robinson, supra note 28, at 1435. See generally DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF 
CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 167–207 (2001). 
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promises, while avoiding the pitfalls, of corporate rehabilitation. 
Section IV.C sketches worthwhile doctrinal changes if pursing a 
corporate incapacitation agenda.  
A. Incapacitation Can Achieve the Promises of Rehabilitation 
Over the past two decades, rehabilitation has emerged as a 
complement to, or competitor of, the fines-centric, cost-minimizing focus 
on economic deterrence that traditionally dominated corporate 
punishment’s rationale. These reform-minded, nonmonetary sanctions 
are defended for solving two concerns with a pure deterrence regime: 
that corporate fines pervert criminal wrongdoing into another line item 
expense and that a focus solely on fines encourages systematic 
underdeterrence. However, appealing to rehabilitation is not necessary 
to answer these concerns; incapacitation as a justification for 
punishment is equally well-situated to answer the expressive worry 
while shoring up specific concerns of underdeterrence. 
1. Rejecting Corporate Crime as a Cost of Doing Business 
Deterrence standing alone is, for many, a brittle foundation on 
which to justify criminal punishment over a comparable civil or 
regulatory sanction.287 Animating this position is a commitment to 
criminal law’s condemnatory function. On this view, the government’s 
choice of criminal over civil enforcement is meant to convey a deeper 
sense of stigma than is captured by civil or regulatory enforcement.288 
To the extent it imposes purely monetary sanctions that are themselves 
indistinguishable from civil fines, however, the government blunts its 
own condemnatory message.289 Worse, it actually encourages the 
already prevalent, pernicious impression that, for corporations, 
criminal misconduct is to be treated as merely a “cost of doing 
business.”290 It is for this reason that Mihailis Diamantis argues 
succinctly that “[t]he picture of corporate crime that [pure] deterrence 
theory encourages is morally repulsive.”291 Representative of the worry, 
 
 287. Gilchrist, supra note 11, at 6 (“[C]arrots and sticks are not sufficient justification for the 
imposition of criminal liability on corporations.”). 
 288. See supra notes 121–131 and accompanying text. 
 289. Samuel W. Buell, Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Civil Liability, in 
PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 31, at 87, 93–96; Thomas, supra note 109, at 617 
(“[T]he expressive problem with corporate-criminal fines is that there is nothing uniquely criminal 
about corporate fines.”). 
 290. Henning, supra note 13, at 1426; Kahan, Social Meaning, supra note 124, at 616–21. 
 291. Diamantis, supra note 13, at 525. 
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Vikramaditya Khanna identifies circumstances where economically 
rational firms should prefer a criminal sanction to a civil one.292  
Embracing incapacitation as a core justification of punishment 
provides an intuitively attractive response to concerns that pure 
deterrence, standing alone, is an insufficient response to corporate 
crime. Incapacitation sends a clear message more conducive to criminal 
punishment: the government is protecting the public from a corporation 
that it cannot otherwise trust not to recidivate. Elsewhere, I have 
argued that to overcome corporate crime’s “cost of doing business” 
problem, the criminal law must either adopt a radically different type 
of monetary sanction than is used in civil settings or else turn to 
nonmonetary sanctions less amenable to the sort of pricing calculus 
reflected in our Beckerian model of corporate crime.293 As advocates of 
corporate rehabilitation have noticed, many of the prohibitions 
described in Part II fit the bill. Incapacitation lends itself to sanctions 
that are not easily susceptible to the economic calculus informing the 
sentiment that corporate crime be treated as a cost of business. And 
insofar as this strategy can be generally spelled out under a banner of 
incapacitation the same as rehabilitation (subject to doctrinal 
modifications considered in Section IV.C), this ostensible benefit to 
rehabilitation as a justification for corporate punishment accrues 
equally to a regime that elevates incapacitation.  
2. Shoring up Underdeterrence  
Even those more sanguine about the centrality of economic 
deterrence to corporate punishment recognize that deterrence runs out 
in systematically predictable ways. After all, principle-agent problems 
pervade the law and theory of corporate governance;294 it is not clear 
why criminal punishment would overcome a general class of problems 
endemic to the corporate form.295  
Even if maximal deterrence were the ambition, monetary 
sanctions are liable to fall short of vindicating this goal in predictable 
ways.296 To this point, John Coffee has long identified that the nature 
 
 292. Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy Analysis, 82 
WASH. U. L.Q. 95 (2004).  
 293. Thomas, supra note 109, at 616–17. 
 294. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 295. Baer, supra note 55, at 7; accord David Ciepley, Can Corporations Be Held to the Public 
Interest, or Even to the Law?, J. BUS. ETHICS 1, 36 (2018). 
 296. Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Causes of Corporate Crime: An Economic 
Perspective, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 31, at 11, 24 (“There is little evidence 
that increasing the magnitude of monetary sanctions has a deterrent effect.”). 
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of corporate crime—its complexity, difficulty to detect, and costliness to 
investigate and prosecute—creates conditions for reliable 
underdeterrence.297 Jennifer Arlen and Marcel Kahan argue that 
nonmonetary policing sanctions are needed when “managers with 
direct or indirect authority over policing benefit personally either from 
tolerating wrongdoing or from deficient policing.”298 Khanna and 
Dickinson have defended the use of corporate monitors as punishment 
in order to prevent future wrongdoing done by insolvent or otherwise 
judgment-proof firms.299  
Again, incapacitation can overcome this problem. On Khanna 
and Dickinson’s view, incapacitation provides a complementary basis 
for corporate punishment to economic deterrence that can shore up the 
institution in these predictable circumstances. Prohibitions can be 
imposed on judgment-proof firms or those with uncontrollable agents. 
B. Incapacitation Can Avoid the Pitfalls of Rehabilitation  
The ambition of corporate rehabilitation is to reform, through 
structural punishments, the institutional and cultural defects that give 
rise to cases of organizational wrongdoing. Advocates see corporations 
as particularly well-situated to be rehabilitated for reasons dialectically 
similar to those discussed in Section III.C—namely, that focusing on 
corporate persons rather than individual moral agents avoids thorny 
normative and practical challenges that face the justification when 
instantiated in the individual context.300  
Translating the principle that corporations are receptive objects 
of rehabilitation into a practice of successfully rehabilitating them 
through punishment, however, is a long way off. Moral, institutional, 
and implementation challenges still exist for corporate rehabilitation—
all of which incapacitation can avoid, ameliorate, or otherwise improve 
upon. 
1. The Criminal Law and Corporate-Governance Reform 
Start with the obvious challenge for rehabilitation: the criminal 
bar lacks both the expertise and the institutional incentives to resolve 
structural defects affecting criminal corporations in a manner that 
 
 297. Coffee, supra note 10, at 387–90; accord Ciepley, supra note 295, at 21–24. 
 298. Arlen & Kahan, supra note 87, at 353; see also Lawrence Summers, Companies on Trial: 
Are They ‘Too Big to Jail’?, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/e3bf9954-7009-
11e4-90af-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/ZCD7-Q6FT]. 
 299. Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 14, at 1731. 
 300. See supra note 276.  
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“reforms” them into good corporate citizens. Modern commercial 
corporations are complex, sophisticated organizations. It is hard to 
identify and prosecute instances of organizational wrongdoing. It is 
harder still to diagnose, and then design away, the structural and 
cultural defects giving rise to this wrongdoing. And it is harder even 
still to implement and oversee that solution.  
Unfortunately, the criminal bar is situated to carry out only the 
first investigative task—and even doing that requires a major 
investment in time and resources.301 For the remaining tasks, courts 
and prosecutors simply lack the expertise necessary to design 
structural solutions.302 This is not a criticism as much as it is an 
observation: nothing about legal training suggests that these issues of 
corporate governance and business management fall anywhere in the 
competence of actors in the criminal justice system.303 This might 
matter less if the criminal justice system were being used not for its 
expertise but rather as a focal point for coordinating policy design 
among law enforcement officials, regulatory agencies, and private 
parties.304 As Veronica Root recently demonstrated in reviewing the 
state of corporate compliance, however, prosecutors have not proved 
particularly adept at marshaling together interested parties in more 
than a single case.305 Particularly without a proven track record of 
successful, longitudinal collaboration across cases, it is hard to imagine 
how a one-off encounter with the criminal justice system provides 
sufficient information to diagnose and design impactful governance 
reforms. 
That courts and prosecutors lack the expertise to rehabilitate a 
criminal corporation’s internal governance structure is reflected in the 
“questionable governance provisions” they actually impose.306 This 
Article has already questioned whether policing measures should be 
characterized as reformist.307 But even putting that worry aside, in 
practice there is a well-documented disconnect between the rhetoric of 
 
 301. See supra Section I.A. 
 302. Miriam Hechler Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 1035, 1055 (2008) 
(collecting authorities). 
 303. Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Limiting Prosecutorial 
Discretion to Impose Structural Reforms, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 31, at 
62; Baer, supra note 302, at 1057. 
 304. Barkow, supra note 249, at 191–95. 
 305. Root, supra note 69, at 1010–18. 
 306. Baer, supra note 55, at 10. 
 307. See supra notes 244–256 and accompanying text. 
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reform and the policies of “cosmetic compliance” imposed.308 Bill Laufer, 
canvassing the recent history of compliance efforts through the criminal 
law, is scathing in his criticism of what has become a “compliance game” 
whose “incentives and disincentives are not designed to change 
corporate behavior, improve corporate culture, or facilitate corporate 
decisionmaking.”309 Moreover, prosecutors imposing reforms have 
shown little interest in determining whether those changes are 
succeeding in their stated purpose.310 Taken together, there is little 
reason to think that the policing reforms actually implemented will 
have a rehabilitative benefit. 
For my part, I remain sympathetic to the general intuition that 
corporate-governance reform is a profitable path for resolving issues of 
degraded corporate culture. But it is worth looking to the literature on 
corporate-governance reform to illustrate the gap between the promise 
and the reality of efforts within the criminal law. A rich vein of 
corporate scholarship focuses on reforming structural problems 
stemming from the corporate form:311 constraining norms that permit, 
or outright encourage, corporations to act illegally;312 deprioritizing 
shareholder wealth maximization, which otherwise crowds out civic-
minded uses of corporate resources;313 and incorporating employees into 
core mechanisms of governance through codetermination or corporate 
democracy, thereby disabling their sustained mistreatment.314 Whether 
these reforms would accomplish their goals of corporate reform—either 
in general or if repurposed into corporate punishment—is a further 
empirical question. But the gap highlights how far removed our current 
 
 308. Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Should the Behavior of Top Management Matter?, 91 GEO. L.J. 
1215, 1231 (2003). See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of 
Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003). 
 309. William S. Laufer, The Missing Account of Progressive Corporate Criminal Law, 14 
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 71, 112 (2017); accord William S. Laufer, Illusions of Compliance and 
Governance, 6 CORP. GOVERNANCE 239 (2006). 
 310. Garrett, supra note 48, at 1847. 
 311. See KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND 
PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 13–40 (2006) (collecting and evaluating reform proposals). 
 312. Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 117, at 1177 (describing managers’ duty to break 
the law).  
 313. LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST 
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 24–32 (2012); David Millon, Radical 
Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013, 1025–34 (2013); Elizabeth Warren, Companies 
Shouldn’t Be Accountable Only to Shareholders, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 14, 2018, 7:01 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-shouldnt-be-accountable-only-to-shareholders-
1534287687 [https://perma.cc/PVY8-QKZY]. 
 314. See, e.g., Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic 
Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 334 (2008); Marleen A. O’Connor, The Human 
Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 
CORNELL L. REV. 899, 936–65 (1993). 
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penal practices are from addressing substantive issues of corporate 
governance that experts in the field think underwrite institutional 
misconduct. 
For all of these reasons, mechanisms of incapacitation are easier 
to design and enforce. This is particularly true for the sorts of 
incapacitative corporate punishments we’ve discussed that involve 
clear, bright-line prohibitions.315 But incapacitation generally lends 
itself to clear, discrete sanctions that are easier to impose and monitor. 
To be sure, incapacitative sanctions are not without their own risks; 
courts and prosecutors need to be careful not to adopt restraints so 
severe as to constitute a de facto “corporate death penalty.”316 
Nevertheless, and as the framework developed here demonstrates, 
incapacitation admits of a far wider range of outcomes than termination 
or nothing. More to the point, these are sanctions that actors within the 
criminal law are particularly capable of carrying out. 
2. Institutional Propriety and the Virtues of Pessimism 
The prior Section could be construed as holding prosecutors and 
courts to an ungenerously high standard. But the better argument is 
that fault lies in relying on rehabilitation as an unduly sunny rationale 
for punishment; incapacitation, by comparison, offers an appropriately 
realistic view of what sorts of prevention the criminal law can be 
expected to achieve. In short, whereas rehabilitation looks to make 
criminals “better” than they were before, incapacitation is content with 
merely preventing them from engaging in further harm.  
Underwriting rehabilitation is an optimism both about a 
person’s ability to change for the better and specifically about state 
sanctions motivating that change.317 In their defense, advocates of 
corporate rehabilitation are probably correct that, practically, it is 
easier to achieve rehabilitation for corporations than individuals—
though this is a large bar if we consider that much of the basis for this 
claim rests on the fact that cognitive science is (and will be for a while) 
in its infancy.318 Regardless, it remains the case that rehabilitation as 
a justification for punishment seeks to deliver a particular type of social 
value that—tabling the moral concerns present at least in the 
 
 315. See supra Section III.A.2. 
 316. See supra Sections I.B, III.A (discussing collateral consequences). 
 317. See Victoria McGeer & Friederike Funk, Are ‘Optimistic’ Theories of Criminal Justice 
Psychologically Feasible? The Probative Case of Civic Republicanism, 11 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 523, 524 
(2017) (“These more optimistic theories generally presuppose that people are sensitive, not just to 
the push and pull of cost and benefit—not just to the conditioning effects of penalty and reward—
but also to the overtures and persuasions of their fellows.”). 
 318. Id. 
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individual context—sets a high bar for determining whether a given 
punishment is successful qua punishment. And moreover, it is not clear 
that corporate rehabilitation’s comparative moral and practical 
advantages over its individual counterpart are all that robust. That is 
because the rehabilitative turn seeks to make corporations act ethically, 
not to make them actually become ethical agents. But it is highly 
controversial as a matter of both criminal law and moral psychology 
whether a constitutively amoral agent can reliably act ethically for 
prudential reasons.319 In short, corporate rehabilitation avoids one 
longstanding moral and practical conundrum in criminal law only to 
implicate a different one. 
Incapacitation, by comparison, represents a more pessimistic 
view of prevention.320 Whereas an act succeeds as rehabilitation only if 
it makes the criminal “better” than she was before, incapacitation 
succeeds merely if it prevents further harm from occurring. The success 
conditions thus impliedly favor incapacitation in two respects. First, 
incapacitation is more tolerant of the possibility of harm. For better or 
worse, incapacitation is not appealed to as producing a benefit to the 
offender herself; as an upshot, that punishment (unproductively) harms 
the offender’s interest is less an object to incapacitation than it is to 
rehabilitation.  
Second, incapacitation better aligns institutional competencies. 
This is not to suggest that optimism about corporate-governance reform 
is generally mistaken, just that it is misplaced to the extent that the 
criminal law is being held up as the proper legal domain for pursuing 
structural reform. Unique to the corporate context, the law already has 
an entire domain—namely, corporate law—dedicated to this 
enterprise.321 To be sure, there may be widespread disagreement over 
how successful corporate law can be in this enterprise. But if there is a 
place to search for deep rehabilitative reforms to corporate governance, 
“we should probably look beyond the confines of corporate criminal 
liability, to corporate law itself.”322 
 
 319. See Michael J. Vitacco et al., Holding Psychopaths Morally and Criminally Culpable, 5 
EMOTION REV. 423 (2013) (collecting authorities). 
 320. Darley et al., supra note 150, at 660 (describing “the incapacitation perspective” as a 
“pessimistic” view of prevention). 
 321. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 439, 441 (2001) (“All thoughtful people believe that corporate enterprise should be organized 
and operated to serve the interests of society as a whole . . . .”); cf. Johnson, supra note 231, at 1151 
(“[C]orporations have been permitted to advance private interests and corporate law itself has 
been deregulatory, but only because that particular approach was thought to be socially 
beneficial.”). 
 322. Baer, supra note 55, at 14; accord Ciepley, supra note 295, at 35–37. 
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C. Identifying Doctrinal Reforms for an Incapacitation Agenda 
Incapacitation can serve as a basis for meaningful 
improvements to how we punish corporations. While it is beyond the 
scope of this Article to propose detailed enactments, the framework 
developed here offers a roadmap for how best to leverage a shift away 
from a rehabilitation mindset and toward an incapacitation mindset. 
1. Emphasize Corporate Criminal Prohibitions 
What doctrinal and practical consequences should follow from 
elevating incapacitation to be a core justification for punishment, 
particularly at the expense of rehabilitation? First, the criminal law 
should focus attention on expanding the set of prohibitions that could 
be imposed against criminal corporations. This Article has already 
identified several such candidates: targeted asset forfeiture, exit from 
certain lines of business or business practices, termination of client and 
counterparty relationships, entering into preapproval arrangements, 
etc.323 Which sanctions to leverage and when to leverage them will be a 
challenging, case-specific, empirical inquiry. But at least as a next step, 
reformers should investigate these and similar bright-line prohibitions 
as viable complements and alternatives to some of criminal law’s 
current efforts at nonmonetary sanctions. 
Clear prohibitions have the advantage over complex governance 
reforms of being easier for the criminal law to impose, monitor, and 
enforce either directly or under the supervision of a monitor. 
Meanwhile, the past decade of prosecution agreements provides 
evidence that punishments vindicating incapacitation in this manner 
need not, and often do not, reliably result in de facto termination. More 
narrowly targeted prohibitions may turn out to be more sustainable as 
punishment and less wasteful than costly compliance reforms of 
dubious efficacy. As a first step, more needs to be done to investigate 
the efficacy of business constraints being imposed, mostly through 
prosecution agreements. These sanctions have been less severe than 
collateral consequences, which are quite broad in their scope. The use 
of targeted prohibitions suggests a model for reform to supplement 
deterrence—particularly in cases where adequate deterrence would 
require fines too costly to impose. 
Second, courts and prosecutors should mostly retreat from their 
strategy of reforming a corporation’s internal compliance and 
 
 323. See supra notes 82–89 (discussing prohibitions on business activities); see Catherine E. 
McCaw, Asset Forfeiture as a Form of Punishment: A Case for Integrating Asset Forfeiture into 
Criminal Sentencing, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 181, 197–203 (2011). 
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governance structures. While some core sets of reforms might remain, 
the federal government should, at the very least, get out of the business 
of designing intricate, bespoke changes to criminal corporations. As a 
corollary, this would further require (or benefit from) either relaxing 
the attention to “effective compliance” in charging and sentencing 
decisions or else, more likely, providing a clearer statement of what 
requirements a minimally effective compliance program must satisfy. 
Third, courts and prosecutors may not be experts at governance 
reforms, but they can still improve performance with respect to 
recidivism. The criminal bar should do more to track and monitor 
corporate wrongdoing across time and enforcement actions. Prosecutors 
lack the expertise and incentives to reorganize a corporate structure, 
but they certainly have resources to help identify instances of intrafirm 
recidivism and patterns of misconduct over time.324 Doing so would 
assist in identifying reasonable prohibitions to apply to a given criminal 
corporation. 
2. Diversify Control over Collateral Consequences 
The major downside of prohibitive sanctions is that they risk 
overpunishment by causing the entity to collapse. At the moment, 
however, the practical threat of this outcome comes from specific, wide-
scoping collateral consequences, the impact of which falls outside the 
control of the criminal justice system. Regardless of whether the 
general concerns over collateral consequences are overblown in 
discussions of corporate punishment, some consequences do pose 
existential threats to specific industries. It is a much larger question 
whether and under what circumstances these sorts of collateral 
consequences should exist at all. This question is even more pressing 
with respect to the dense web of consequences that impact individuals, 
which have lately become so oppressive as to have been described as a 
form of “civil death.”325 But at least as a first correction, courts should 
be given more authority over the attachment of automatic regulatory 
collateral consequences.  
For purposes of this Article, a next step would be to maintain the 
status quo but give courts veto power over the attachment of automatic 
collateral consequences. This authority need not be exclusive to courts; 
regulators should have their review authority expanded to include 
courts rather than shifted to courts. On this point, recent amendments 
to Regulation D under the Securities Act, one of the existential 
 
 324. Root, supra note 69, at 1010–18. 
 325. Chin, supra note 226, at 1790. 
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consequences, is instructive. Although the SEC has long been 
authorized to waive automatic exclusion from Regulation D offerings 
upon “a showing of good cause,”326 in 2013 Congress expanded this 
waiver authority to allow “the court . . . that entered the relevant order, 
judgment or decree” to decide that “disqualification . . . should not arise 
as a consequence.”327 This provision should provide a model for 
regulatory collateral consequences, particularly if the criminal law is to 
engage meaningfully with functionally similar, but less destructive, 
methods for incapacitating criminal corporations. 
CONCLUSION 
Incapacitation is a textbook justification for criminal 
punishment. If true for individuals, it should be true for corporations as 
well. Specious appeals to “corporate bodies” not to the contrary, the idea 
of incapacitating a corporation need not be conceptually strange or 
mysterious. Incapacitation is about restraining a person from acting in 
the future in a manner that gave rise to past criminality; our ordinary 
experiences and settled legal practices have long made sense of both the 
idea of a corporation acting and the law being used to stop a corporation 
from acting. And this is not merely a conceptual point. Looking at actual 
practices, the goal, and not just the incidental effect, of at least some 
already imposed sanctions appears to be corporate incapacitation. The 
criminal law, then, already implicitly relies on incapacitation as a 
justification for corporate punishment.  
While recognizing incapacitation as a justification for corporate 
punishment might appear to threaten a major break from the criminal 
law of corporations as currently understood, in practice, the upshot is 
that taking incapacitation seriously need not dramatically upend 
current practices. Indeed, well-settled moral considerations 
constraining the propriety of incapacitation when levied against 
individuals suggest that we may in fact have stronger reason to 
incapacitate corporations than we do individuals. 
Moreover, incapacitating criminal corporations is not just 
possible, it is desirable. Incapacitation plausibly represents a more 
useful complement to deterrence than does corporate rehabilitation. 
Elevating incapacitation over rehabilitation creates space for concrete 
changes to current practices of corporate punishment that better align 
with the criminal law’s competencies and avoid entangling the federal 
 
 326. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(d)(2)(ii) (2019). 
 327. Id. § 230.506(d)(2)(iii); see Emily Flitter, Settlements for 3 Wall Street Banks Hold a Silver 
Lining, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2FBeXSg [https://perma.cc/4G7B-LAPZ].  
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government in dubious governance reforms to private companies. This 
gives reason to take incapacitation seriously as a justification for 
corporate punishment. 
 
